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Abstract
The Shodan computer search engine crawls the Internet attempting to identify any
connected device. Using Shodan, researchers identified thousands of Internet-facing
devices associated with industrial controls systems (ICS). This research examines the
impact of Shodan on ICS security, evaluating Shodans ability to identify
Internet-connected ICS devices and assess if targeted attacks occur as a result of Shodan
identification. In addition, this research evaluates the ability to limit device exposure to
Shodan through service banner manipulation. Shodans impact was evaluated by deploying
four high-interaction, unsolicited honeypots over a 55 day period, each configured to
represent Allen-Bradley programmable logic controllers (PLC). All four honeypots were
successfully indexed and identifiable via the Shodan web interface in less than 19 days.
Despite being indexed, there was no increased network activity or targeted ICS attacks.
Although results indicate Shodan is an effective reconnaissance tool, results contrast
claims of its use to broadly identify and target Internet-facing ICS devices. Additionally,
the service banner for two PLCs were modified to evaluate the impact on Shodan indexing
capabilities. Findings demonstrated service banner manipulation successfully limited
device exposure from Shodan queries.
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IMPACT OF THE SHODAN COMPUTER SEARCH ENGINE ON
INTERNET-FACING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM DEVICES
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
I
ndustrial control systems (ICS) are integral to United States critical infrastructure,
allowing real-time remote management of large-scale industrial processing supporting
oil and gas pipelines, water distribution systems, electrical power grids, nuclear plants,
and other manufacturing operations. In 2005, the SANS Institute estimated over 3 million
active ICSs, with an expected 8.9% annual growth culminating in approximately 6 million
ICSs by 2013, with nearly all critical infrastructure sectors moving to advanced control
systems [23]. This growth, combined with market demand, has lead to a shift towards ICS
network connectivity to lower operational costs and increase efficiency. In some cases
ICSs are connected to the corporate networks, while in other more pernicious
circumstances ICSs are directly accessible via the Internet.
In fiscal 2012, Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT) responded to 198 cyber incidents involving critical infrastructure
systems, a 65% increase over the 120 attacks reported in 2011 [26]. In addition, recent
research identified thousands of ICS associated devices readily accessible via the Internet
[6, 30]. The steady rise in cyber incidents combined with exponential growth and
increased connectivity presents a monumental security risk to United States national
security.
1
1.2 Motivation
In 2009, John Matherly launched Shodan, a computer search engine designed to
identify and index Internet-facing devices [43]. Four years later, CNN referred to Shodan
as “The scariest search engine on the Internet,” reporting that Shodan collects information
on more than 500 million devices and services a month [18].
Shodan is a search engine that scans the Internet for any Internet-facing device. The
Shodan database contains web and security cameras, home automation, traffic lights, car
washes, and even an entire hockey rink [18]. One of the most discerning aspects is the vast
number of industrial control devices identifiable via Shodan. These devices control critical
infrastructure to include oil and gas pipelines, water, power grids, and nuclear plants.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stated Shodan allows malicious and skilled
adversaries ready access to admittedly fragile systems, some of which support United
States critical infrastructure [39]. Since Shodan’s launch in 2009, direct Internet ICS
connectivity has continued to grow despite insistent urgings from public and private
security experts. Research has demonstrated that Shodan is a capable reconnaissance tool
[6, 30] and has shown Internet-facing ICS devices are being attacked [52]; however, there
lacks empirical evidence to support the claim Shodan is actively being used to target
Internet-facing ICS devices and if it is being used, what the impact is on ICS device
security.
1.3 Problem Statement
This research evaluates Shodan’s impact on Internet-facing ICS device security. The
primary goals of this research are to evaluate Shodan indexing functionality, contrast
network activity levels as a result of Shodan indexing and identification, and enumerate
ICS specific targeting of Internet-facing ICS devices. The secondary goal is to assess the
ability to limit Shodan device exposure via service banner manipulation. It is
hypothesized that as a result of Shodan identification, Internet-facing ICS devices will see
2
increased network activity, to include specific attacks targeting ICS protocols. It is further
hypothesized that a device presenting a more enticing service banner will see increased
network activity post Shodan identification as compared to both the standard and
obfuscated devices.
1.4 Approach
This research presents an evaluation of the Shodan computer search engine’s impact
on Internet-facing ICS device security by deploying unsolicited, Internet-facing ICS
honeypots. The honeypots are designed and configured to be representative of ICS devices
currently identifiable via Shodan. The primary goals are to evaluate Shodan indexing
functionality, contrast network activity levels as a result of Shodan identification, and
enumerate specific ICS targeting or attacks. Shodan indexing functionality is evaluated by
determining Shodan’s scanning routine, scanning frequency, and web database
identification timeliness. Network activity is analyzed by measuring transmission control
protocol (TCP) connections, total TCP packet count, and the number of unique Internet
protocol (IP) addresses interacting with each honeypot. Shodan identification is defined as
the date a device service banner is successfully indexed and the device is identifiable via
the Shodan web interface. Specific ICS targeting and attacks are evaluated by visual
packet inspection and analysis using the Snort intrusion detection system (IDS) with
known ICS signatures.
The cornerstone of Shodan is a database containing Internet-facing device service
banners. A service banner refers to information provided by a system in response to a
connection request. Using the information revealed in a service banner, users are able to
craft custom search queries in Shodan capable of specifically identifying ICS devices. To
assess the ability to limit Shodan device exposure via service banner manipulation, two
honeypots are deployed with altered service banners. One honeypot presents an enticing
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service banner directly identifying the device make and model, while the second honeypot
replaces the service banner with random data in attempts to obfuscate the device.
The results of this research provide insight into Shodan’s impact on Internet-facing
ICS devices. Specifically, results indicate if Shodan is actively being used as a passive
reconnaissance tool to target Internet-facing ICS devices. The results of the banner
mangled honeypot analysis reveal potential defensive measures to limit a device’s
exposure to Shodan query identification.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
This research provides an indication of Shodan’s impact on Internet-facing ICS
device security. Previous research efforts provide evidence ICS devices are deployed
Internet-facing [6], Shodan is capable of identifying these ICS devices [30], and
Internet-facing ICS devices are being directly targeted [52]. No research, however,
currently exists assessing the correlation between Shodan device identification and
specific device targeting. This section presents the assumptions and limitations of the
research. Future research can build on this work and address these limitations.
1.5.1 Scope.
The scope of this research extends to Internet-facing ICS programmable logic
controllers (PLCs), specifically Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs. A characterization of
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs currently identifiable via Shodan is used to develop the
design for each honeypot. Future research should extend ICS honeypot deployment to
measure the impact of Shodan on additional ICS field devices and device manufacturers.
1.5.2 Time.
The primary goal of this research is to evaluate the impact of Shodan on
Internet-facing ICS security. As such, the assessment evaluated a 55 day deployment
period. The deployment period was selected based on previous ICS honeypot research and
an approximation of the time required to scan all public Internet protocol version 4 (IPv4)
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addresses. It is assumed the findings are indicative of Shodan characteristics. Future
research could consider longer deployment to obtain a larger dataset for analysis.
1.5.3 Programmable Logic Controller.
This research uses the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61 central processing
unit (CPU) module and eWeb Ethernet module. Honeypot design and configuration is
based on a random sampling of 10% of Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs currently
identifiable via Shodan. Specifically, nine characteristics: CPU type, CPU firmware
version, Ethernet module type, Ethernet module firmware version, naming conventions,
number of modules, type of modules, chassis size, and available services. It is assumed
the characterization of Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs identifiable via Shodan allows
the results to be representative of the larger population of Internet-facing Allen-Bradley
ControlLogix PLCs. Future research may extend to additional PLC manufacturers and
models.
1.5.4 Deployment Location.
The ability to obtain Internet-facing IP space co-located with an ICS entity limited
the honeynet design and the size of the honeynet. Available resources allowed for the
deployment of four ICS honeypots and dictated the honeypots be deployed with sequential
static IP addresses in the same subnet. Although there was no evidence this impacted the
results of this research, future research could seek a broader deployment to include
multiple venues and additional honeypots.
1.6 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 presents a detailed background and overview of related research. Chapter 3
provides the research methodology to include honeypot design, deployment, and data
evaluation. Chapter 4 provides implementation details as well as the results of this
research. Chapter 5 discusses the research conclusions, future work, and concluding
remarks.
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II. Background
2.1 Industrial Control Systems
ICSs date back to 1959 with the deployment of a Thompson Ramo Wooldridge
RW-300 direct digital control process computer installed at the Texaco refinery in Port
Arthur, Texas [24]. ICSs encompass several different control systems utilized throughout
the industrial processing and critical infrastructure communities. By design, these systems
allow real-time remote management of large-scale industrial processing [3]. They monitor
and control critical infrastructure supporting oil and gas pipelines, water distribution
systems, electrical power grids, nuclear plants, and other manufacturing operations. Two
types of ICSs are supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and
distributed control systems (DCSs).
SCADA systems are highly distributed systems, providing automated control and
remote human monitoring of real-world processes [3]. The supervisory control aspect of
SCADA relates to the operator’s ability to control remote processes via field devices such
as remote terminal units (RTUs) and PLCs. Data acquisition references the transfer of
data from RTUs and PLCs to a centralized control center where it is displayed to the
operator via a human machine interface (HMI). Figure 2.1 depicts a typical SCADA
system architecture. SCADA system architecture is comprised of four layers. Layer one,
consists of the physical ICS assets (e.g., mechanical valve or digital temperature gauge).
Layer two is comprised of field devices (e.g., RTUs and PLCs). Layer three is made up of
the control network housing the actual ICS. The uppermost layer, layer four, is home of
the traditional information technology (IT) network, hosting the corporate network and
controlling site manufacturing operations [8].
DCSs are computerized control systems wherein the controlling elements are not
centralized [3]. Rather, control is distributed throughout the system, with each component
6
Figure 2.1: A typical control system architecture [8].
sub-system controlled by one or more controllers. Although the distinction of distributed
control varies widely from the essence of SCADA systems, DCS basic components are
similar to SCADA systems: HMI, master terminal unit (MTU), and field devices.
2.1.1 Master Terminal Unit.
The MTU is the system controller, located in the control center. The MTU issues
commands to field devices in remote locations primarily serving to gather, store, and
process data [3]. Ultimately, all data is provided to the operator, via the HMI, as human
readable information in the form of pictures and tables.
2.1.2 Human-Machine Interface.
The HMI enables communication between the MTU and the human operator.
Readable data transmitted from the MTU to the HMI is displayed graphically to the
operator in the form of a mimic diagram. A mimic diagram provides a schematic
representation of the remote processing location (Figure 2.2). The HMI, in conjunction
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with the MTU, provides the operator access to RTUs and PLCs, thus allowing the operator
to monitor and control remote processes.
Figure 2.2: HMI mimic diagram [54].
2.1.3 Field Devices.
RTUs are rugged industrial computers whose primary function is to interface with
field devices, collecting telemetry data to transfer to the MTU. When an intelligent
electronic device (IED) receives an instruction from the MTU, the RTU forwards the
command (e.g., open or close a valve). Common types of IEDs include protective relaying
devices, circuit breaker controllers, valves, and voltage regulators.
PLCs are specialized computers similar to RTUs. The distinguishing feature between
PLCs and RTUs is the PLC’s ability to conduct operation-based Boolean logic, thus
providing the automation and regulatory control of industrial processes [3]. PLCs connect
directly to field data interface devices, and incorporate programmed intelligence in the
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form of logical procedures (e.g., Ladder Logic), which is executed in the event of certain
field conditions [54]. Basic features of some PLCs include a web server and device
specific communications protocols. The web server provides access to information from
the control system using a web browser, while also allowing remote control system
monitoring and modification. The device specific communications protocol service
provides remote control and management of the programmable logic residing on the
device.
2.1.4 Industrial Control System Communications.
ICS communication networks are comprised of the physical medium used to transfer
data between the control center and field devices, and the device specific communication
protocols. Typically ICSs employ one of three mediums: cable, telephone, or radio [3].
Since ICS inception, numerous proprietary protocols have emerged, but Modbus,
distributed network protocol (DNP3), and Ethernet industrial protocol (EtherNet/IP) have
emerged as the most prolific protocols [10]. The Modbus messaging protocol was
developed in 1979 by Modicon to establish master-slave/client-server communication
between intelligent devices, allowing for communication of up to 247 devices and later
incorporated TCP [35]. DNP3 is a set of protocols developed for communications
between various types of data acquisition and control equipment. In 2010, the DNP3
Technical Committee, in coordination with Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), established DNP3 as the standard for Electrical Power System
Communications (i.e., IEEE 1815) [14]. EtherNet/IP, originally developed by Rockwell
Automation in 2001, currently managed by the Open DeviceNet Vendors
Association (ODVA), is an application layer protocol similar to simple network
management protocol (SNMP) implementing the common industrial protocol (CIP) over
transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) [38].
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2.2 ICS Security
2.2.1 Requirements.
Within the United States, ICSs control the majority of key critical infrastructure to
include power, water, transportation, and financial systems [49]. As such, the security of
ICSs is integral to United States national defense. Concerns for the security of these
systems has been expressed in multiple instances over the past two decades. In 1997,
under Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), President Bill Clinton created the
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection to discuss the threat to control systems
and the potential effects a successful attack could have on the electric power and oil and
gas industries [31]. In 2001, after the attacks on the World Trade Center, the United States
Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act (H.R. 3162), that included the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, which states, “any physical or virtual disruption of
the operation of the critical infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief,
geographically limited in effect, manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy,
human and government services, and national security of the United States” [36].
In 2002, the National Research Council (NRC) identified the potential for attack on
control systems as requiring urgent attention, finding that security experts reported 70% of
energy and power companies experienced at least one severe cyber attack [19]. In 2003,
President George W. Bush demonstrated concern regarding the threat of organized cyber
attacks capable of causing debilitating disruption to national critical infrastructures,
specifically noting the disruption could have significant consequences for public health
and safety and emphasizing that the protection of control systems has become a national
priority [19]. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) posits a cyber
attack on energy production and distribution systems could endanger public health and
safety, damage the environment, and have serious financial implications [19]. Economist
Scott Borg projects that if a third of the country lost power for three months, the economic
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price tag would be $700 billion, “a greater economic damage than any modern economy
ever suffered...greater than the Great Depression...greater than the damage the United
States did with strategic bombing on Germany in World War II” [33].
To understand the security concerns surrounding ICSs, it is first required to
understand their inherent fragility. The real-time nature of ICSs requires system security
to focus primarily on availability while also simultaneously introducing physical safety,
performance, and graceful degradation [55]. By virtue of this prioritization, ICSs were
designed to maximize performance, reliability, and efficiency, not designed for security.
ICS security initially relied upon robust physical protection and network obscurity. A
demand for increased availability, advances in technology, and the highly distributed
nature of control systems has led to a demand for network connectivity, complexity, and
extensibility introducing a new level of security threats and vulnerabilities. The call for
connectivity led to a migration to TCP/IP as the predominant communications protocol
suite used in connecting network hosts and the eventual widespread connection to the
Internet. In 2011, Symantec assessed the threat to SCADA as critical, citing 129 public
control system vulnerabilities, illustrating a substantial increase over the 15 vulnerabilities
in 2010 [46]. ICS-CERT cited 171 unique vulnerabilities affecting ICS products as of
December 2012 [50]. The expansion from physically separated closed networks to
Internet connectivity exposed ICSs to not only specific device targeting, but traditional IT
security attacks.
The evolution, from a closed network to Internet connectivity, not only exposed
control systems to a vast number of threats and threat vectors, it also resulted in a
convergence of control system security and traditional IT security [55]. IT security
prioritization runs counter to ICS security, prioritizing confidentiality and integrity above
availability. As ICSs are considered real-time operating systems and designed to operate
for years without rebooting or interruption, traditional IT security practices are difficult to
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perform due to the potentially disastrous effects on the core principles of ICS security:
availability, reliability, performance, and safety [55]. Typical IT security and network
administration practices include software updates, equipment upgrades, data encryption,
anti-virus software, network assessments, and penetration testing. Andres Andreu, chief
architect and vice president of engineering for Bayshore Networks, a leading ICS security
firm, states, “There are a lot of controllers out there from the 1960’s and 1970’s that can’t
handle sophisticated security; PLCs with bytes of memory, unable to handle anymore
information, let alone updates” [22]. Eric Byres, Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of
Belden’s Tofino Security, stated one vendor his firm works with estimates that less than 10
percent of its customers download the PLC patches it issues [22]. Data encryption and
anti-virus software, two vital aspects of IT security, can cause network latency that
negatively impacts overall performance [45]. A task such as mapping the network to
identify hosts, operating systems, ports, and services can have catastrophic effects. In one
example, upon performing a ping sweep of an active SCADA network controlling a 9-foot
robotic arm, it was noted that one arm became active and swung around 180 degrees [45].
In another example, a ping sweep of an ICS network to identify hosts caused a system
controlling the creation of integrated circuits in the fabrication plant to lockup, resulting in
the destruction of $50,000 worth of wafers [45].
Penetration testing, a vital resource to network administrators, suffers from similar
problems concerning ICS networks. Penetration testing involves simulating an attack from
the perspective of a potential attacker, focusing on vulnerability discovery in order to
strengthen network defense [42]. Because penetration testing involves active exploitation
of security vulnerabilities, the potential risk to live production ICSs is high and the
potential to crash a network consequently prevents penetration testing implementation.
For example, in one incident, a natural gas utility hired an IT security consulting firm to
test their corporate network. During the assessment, the consultants inadvertently
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accessed the ICS network, causing the ICS to lock up, ultimately preventing the utility
from sending gas through its pipelines for over four hours [45]. Based on these and
similar incidents, ICS operators are hesitant to implement traditional IT security
protocols. Consequently, the relationship between ICS security and management
continues to clash with traditional network security practices, ultimately leaving ICS
networks and devices vulnerable to exploitation.
United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) highlights three
areas wherein ICSs show the greatest vulnerability to attack: software security,
configuration, and network security [49]. ICS software commonly suffers from the lack of
secure software design and coding practices, leaving ICS network protocols and
associated server applications prone to man-in-the-middle (MITM) data attacks,
unvalidated user input, and subject to considerable information leakage through vulnerable
custom ICS web services [49]. Many ICS individual component vulnerabilities are
dependent on specific device implementation and include: un-patched operating systems,
applications, and service vulnerabilities; failure to configure and implement applications
and services securely (e.g., selecting security options and protecting credentials); default
passwords; weak password policies; user accounts, applications, and services with
administrator permissions; default security features; and open network connections [49].
US-CERT claims ICS networks are particularly susceptible to attacks due to the lack
of defined security perimeters, network segmentation, and functional demilitarized
zones (DMZ) [49]. In addition, firewalls meant to protect these networks do not take into
account the traffic meant for ICSs and associated devices. Finally, it is a reoccurring
theme throughout the ICS community that the network architecture is poorly understood,
out-dated, and unsecured, which is compounded by weak enforcement of remote login
policies and insufficient methods for monitoring and controlling network events [49].
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2.2.2 Attacks.
ICSs are the foundation of United States critical infrastructure and by their vary
nature are prime targets for attack [33]. The DHS defines cyber threats to a control system
as, “persons who attempt unauthorized access to a control system device and/or network
using a data communications pathway, either trusted internal users or remote exploitation
by persons unknown via the Internet” [49]. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
ICS threat table indicates general threats to control systems can originate from numerous
sources; however, deliberate threats emanate from specific sources, including hostile
governments, terrorist groups, disgruntled employees, industrial spies, organized crime,
and hacktivists [45]. The motive for attack is varied, including competitive industrial
advantage, information warefare, extortion, financial gain, revenge, and terrorism. Attack
vectors include spear-phishing, default authentication implementation, direct Internet
accessibility, and back-doors.
Figure 2.3 provides a timeline of notable control system attacks for the past two
decades according to DHS and NIST. In 2000, an attack against the Maroochy Shire
Sewage facilities Queensland, Australia resulted in over 200,000 gallons of raw sewage
spilling into local parks and rivers severely impacting marine ecosystems and the local
economy [1]. Vitek Boden, a former employee of Hunter Watertech, an Australian firm
specializing in the installation of SCADA radio-controlled sewage equipment, perpetrated
this attack in retaliation for the Maroochy Shire Council declining his bid for a job. Boden
decided to get revenge on both the Council and his former employer by packing his car
with stolen radio equipment and driving around the area on at least 46 occasions from
February 28 to April 23, 2000, issuing radio commands to the sewage equipment [1]. His
actions went unabated for over two months until a traffic violation following an attack
caused him to fall under suspicion and ultimately resulted in his arrest. This incident
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became the first widely known control system attack, exposing the real-world impact
while also demonstrating how difficult it is to catch an attacker.
Figure 2.3: Timeline for notable control system network attacks [27].
In 2003, the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbour, Ohio, was infected
with the Microsoft SQL Slammer worm [47]. The worm infiltrated a private computer
network and caused a network traffic overload on the site. As a result, the Safety
Parameter Display System (SPDS) was inaccessible for almost 5 hours, and the plant
process computer was inaccessible for over 6 hours [47]. The SPDS, a vital component of
the plant Emergency Response Facility Data System (ERFDS), monitors physical plant
parameters to include temperature, pressure, level, valve position, radiation level, and
flow. The worm also disrupted communications on the control networks of at least five
other utilities by propagating so quickly that control system traffic was blocked [47].
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Forensic analysis determined a rogue T1 connection bypassed the firewall and access
control policies, allowing access to the control network. The worm originated from a
software consulting firm’s infected server, utilizing the aforementioned T1 connection.
Fortunately, the plant was idle during the time of the attack; hence no significant safety
issues occurred.
In 2007, the DHS launched project Aurora designed to demonstrate a cyber attack
against a generator [41]. The experiment involved infiltrating a replica power plant control
system and changing the operating cycle of the generator, ultimately resulting in generator
shutdown. Project Aurora proved empirically, in a research setting, the ability to attack a
physical device via the Internet.
“Stuxnet was a game-changer because it opened people’s eyes to the fact that a cyber
event can actually result in physical damage,” says Mark Weatherford, deputy
undersecretary for cyber-security in the National Protection Programs Directorate at the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security [34]. In June 2010, the Belorussian security
VirusBlokAda first discovered Stuxnet, a randomly propagating worm with payloads
targeting specific ICS [34]. Stuxnet spread using traditional security vulnerabilities in
commercial operating systems, and then propagated to two ICS applications (with
hard-coded passwords) to inhibit the functioning of Variable Frequency Drives (VFD)
made by specific vendors [30]. To remain hidden, the worm displayed the last program
sent to the VFDs while running its own code, similar to running a closed circuit
television (CCTV) in a loop. The worm was designed to increase and decrease centrifuge
speeds causing the aluminum housing to expand and contract, ultimately coming into
contact with other centrifuges.
2.2.3 Trending.
ICS Internet connectivity is based on a demand for increased availability, advances in
technology, and the highly distributed nature of control systems. The migration to TCP/IP
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as the predominant communications protocol suite solidified widespread ICS Internet
connectivity. In 2007, the British Columbia Institute of Technology conducted a study of
47 control system cyber incidents occurring between 2002 and 2006 which reported a
remote point of entry as the threat vector [7]. The results indicated that while the business
network was a major source, secondary pathways such as dial-up connections, wireless
systems, public telecommunications networks, VPNs, and third-party connections were all
significant contributors [7]. Figure 2.4 details the results of the study indicating direct
Internet accessibility as tied for the third most often utilized attack vector.
Figure 2.4: Critical infrastructure cyber threat vectors - remote points of entry [7].
In 2008, during a SANS SCADA Security Conference in New Orleans, Tom
Donahue, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior analyst, confirmed the remote cyber
exploitation of electricity utilities outside the United States [9]. Donahue presented a
written statement reading:
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We have information, from multiple regions outside the United States, of
cyber intrusions into utilities, followed by extortion demands. We suspect,
but cannot confirm, that some of these attackers had the benefit of inside
knowledge. We have information that cyberattacks have been used to disrupt
power equipment in several regions outside the United States. In at least one
case, the disruption caused a power outage affecting multiple cities. We do
not know who executed these attacks or why, but all involved intrusions
through the Internet [9].
In 2009, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) conducted a study forecasting the cyber
threat to critical infrastructure from 2010 to 2015, specifically trending control system
exposure. The results of this study forecasted a proliferation of control systems, increased
digital and IP base, expanded use of wireless communications, and lagging security
measures [17]. Specifically, INL predicts the world ICS market to grow at a 8.9% rate into
2015 [17]. Figure 2.5 approximates PLC market growth worldwide through 2015,
resulting is a $17 trillion market.
In addition to ICS proliferation and increased connectivity, ICS is gaining notoriety
across the whitehat and blackhat communities, typically for their vulnerability and
exposure. Security conferences such as DEFCON, Blackhat, RSA, and SANS routinely
provide presentations on ICSs to include attack vectors and specific device exploitation
[8].
2.3 Shodan
In 2009, programmer John Matherly launched Shodan, a computer search engine
supplying a graphical user interface capable of readily identifying Internet-facing devices
[43]. More specifically, Shodan identifies any device with a routable IP address to include
computers, printers, web-cams, and ICS devices. Shodan crawls the Internet indexing
devices and interrogating available services. The bulk of the data retrieved by Shodan is
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Figure 2.5: INL PLC market trending indicating ICS proliferation [17].
taken from “banners”, which are comprised of meta-data a server sends back to the client
[43]. Note that the port 80 service banners obtained by Shodan are in reality HTTP
headers and for consistency this research will use the term banner as indicated in Shodan
documentation. Shodan stores the device IP address, ports, and service banner data in a
searchable database accessible via the Shodanhq.com web interface or through the Shodan
application programming interface (API). Users are able to query the Shodan database
using a series of filters to include: country, hostname, net (i.e., specific IP range),
operating system (OS), and port.
Initially, Shodan began by interrogating basic ports to include port 21 (i.e., FTP), 22
(i.e., SSH), 23 (i.e., Telnet), and 80 (i.e., HTTP), but has since widely expanded port
interrogation to 40 services (Table 2.1) [43]. In addition to an Internet-facing device
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index, Shodan offers an exploit database, a raw nmap data output visualization tool, and
an enumeration module built into the metasploit exploitation framework.
Table 2.1: Shodan documented service interrogation filters [43].
Port Service
21 FTP
22 SSH
23 Telnet
25 SMTP
53 DNS
80 HTTP
81 HTTP
110 POP3
119 NNTP
137 NetBIOS
143 IMAP
161 SNMP
443 HTTPS
445 SMB
465 SMTP
623 IPMI
993 IMAP+SSL
995 POP3+SSL
1023 Telnet
1434 MS-SQL
Port Service
1900 UPnP
2323 Telnet
3306 MySQL
3389 RDP
5000 Synology
5001 Synology
5432 PostgreSQL
5560 Oracle
5632 PC Anywhere
5900 VNC
6379 Redis
7777 Oracle
8000 Qconn
8080 HTTP
8129 Snapstream
8443 HTTPS
9200 ElasticSearch
11211 MemCache
27017 MongoDB
28017 MongoDB Web
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In October 2010, ICS-CERT published a Control Systems Analysis Report
(CSAR-10-025-01 Analysis of Shodan Computer Search Engine) detailing the Shodan
search engine’s capability of identifying potentially vulnerable control system interfaces,
as well as discussing the importance of minimizing network exposure by ensuring that
control system devices are not visible on the Internet [48]. Subsequently, ICS-CERT
released five ICS alerts (ICS-ALERT-10-301- 01, ICS-ALERT-10-301-01A,
ICS-ALERT-11-343-01A, ICS-ALERT-12-046-01, ICS-ALERT-12-046-01A), detailing
further concerns over Shodan’s ability to identify Internet-facing ICS devices [12].
In 2011, Eireann Leverett used Shodan to counter claims of ICS network segregation.
Leverett presented two years of historical evidence, providing timelines and geo-location
of over 7,500 ICS devices connected to the Internet to include: HVAC systems, building
management systems, meters, HMIs, and PLCs [30]. Leverett used 29 specific Shodan
search queries to identify ICS devices. Table 2.2 provides a comparison between
Leverett’s 2011 query results and the same queries executed in 2013 in support of this
research. In approximately two years, the number of identified devices dramatically
increased from 7,500 to 57,409.
Leverett’s research highlights Shodan’s ability to identify global ICS exposure,
providing a reconnaissance tool for attackers. Leverett asserts, “databases of vulnerable
critical national infrastructure will be traded in the future like the data of stolen credit card
numbers today; and as such, the ability to rapidly act in an automated manner on such data
by either defenders or attackers will define the next few years of critical infrastructure
protection” [30].
In 2012, Bob Radvanovsky and Jake Brodsky of InfraCritical launched Project
SHINE (Shodan Intelligence Extraction) to counter claims of ICS network segregation
and expose Internet-facing devices [6]. Project SHINE used the Shodan API and over 700
specifically designed queries to identify vulnerable Internet-facing ICS devices. Project
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Table 2.2: Leverett’s Shodan search results - 2011 vs 2013.
Shodan Query 2011 2013 Category Inc/Dec
A850+Telemetry+Gateway 3 34 Telemetry 1033%
ABB+Webmodule 3 3 Embedded Webserver 0%
Allen-Bradley 23 99 PAC 2533%
/BroadWeb/ 148 352 HMI 6800%
Cimetrics+Eplus+Web+Server 6 16 Embedded Web Server 333%
CIMPLICITY 90 239 HMI 4967%
CitectSCADA 3 3 PCS 0%
EIG+Embedded+Web+Server 104 137 Embeddded Web Server 1100%
eiPortal 1 98 Historian 3233%
EnergyICT 585 2706 RTU 70700%
HMS+AnyBus-S+WebServer 40 121 Embedded Web Server 2700%
i.LON 1342 4643 BMS 110033%
ioLogik 36 184 PLC 4933%
Modbus+Bridge 12 99 Protocol Bridge 2900%
ModbusGW 11 94 Protocol Bridge 2767%
Modicon+M340+CPU 3 56 Protocol Bridge 1767%
Niagara+Web+Server 2794 34560 HAN/BMS 1058867%
NovaTech+HTTPD 1 0 Embedded Web Server -33%
Powerlink 257 3121 BMS/HAN 95467%
Reliance+4+Control+Server 10 6 SCADA -133%
RTS+Scada 15 28 SCADA 433%
RTU560 2 18 RTU 533%
Simatic+HMI 9 91 HMI 2733%
SIMATIC+NET 13 152 HMI 4633%
Simatic+S7 13 201 PLC 6267%
SoftPLC 80 1088 PAC 33600%
TAC/Xenta 1880 9165 BMS 242833%
WAGO 2 89 Telemetry 2900%
webSCADA-Modbus 3 6 HAN 100%
Total 7489 57409
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SHINE partnered with DHS to identify over 500,000 Internet-facing ICS related nodes
worldwide [6]. Further coordination with ICS experts and ICS-CERT narrowed the results
to 7,200 devices, with many lacking even the most basic security precautions and using
weak, default, or no authentication [50].
In 2013, a researcher presented his findings on Internet-exposed critical infrastructure
devices at the SANS North American ICS and SCADA Summit [5]. The researcher
demonstrated two examples for identifying Internet-facing ICS devices by using Google
search queries. Indeed, the researcher was able to identify Siemens S7 PLCs and
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs exposed to the Internet. In one case, the researcher was
able to use readily available Internet tools to identify the water facility being controlled
and affirm operating characteristics, physical location, and the individual responsible for
the system. Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 outline the security concerns and implications for each
device based on direct Internet accessibility. This research reaffirms the inherent insecurity
of ICSs and exemplifies the potential for Internet-facing ICS device exploitation.
Table 2.3: Siemens S7 - Security concerns and implications [5].
Security Concerns
1. Listening on port 102 allows device management over TCP
2. Listening on port 21 and port 80
3. Firmware version outdated
4. Able to map network architecture
Implications
1. SSA-724606: It is possible to cause device to go into defect
mode by sending specially crafted packets to port 102
2. ICS-ALERT-11-204-01B: Undocumented functions allow
access to internal diagnostics via undocumented password
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Table 2.4: Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1769 - Security concerns and implications [5].
Security Concerns
1. Listening on diagnostic port 44818
2. Firmware version outdated
3. Configured for Remote Run
4. Security set to No Protection
Implications
1. Complete control of device and operating parameters
2. Ability to connect and retrieve project file
3. Ability to push new project file and firmware
4. Ability to disable PLC access to internal diagnostics via
undocumented password
2.4 Related Research
2.4.1 Honeypots.
A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or
illicit use of that resource [44]. Indeed, a honeypot is a decoy server or system designed to
gather information regarding an attack or intrusion into a network or system [15].
Honeypots are categorized as either low-interaction or high-interaction. Low-interaction
honeypots offer limited interaction, utilizing service and operating system emulation, and
provide an easily deployable security mechanism with minimal risk [44]. Table 2.5 details
the advantages and disadvantages of low-interaction honeypots.
High-interaction honeypots are typically more complex and designed to imitate the
activities of real systems by hosting a variety of services through the use of real operating
systems and applications [44]. High-interaction honeypots appear more realistic and
appealing from an attackers perspective, but also increases the risk of the honeypot as
attackers may use the real operating systems to attack non-honeypot systems. Table 2.6
details the advantages and disadvantages of high-interaction honeypots.
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Table 2.5: Low-interaction honeypots: Advantages vs Disadvantages [44].
Low-interaction: Emulated operating systems and services
Advantages
• Easy to install and deploy. Typically requires installing and
configuring software on a computer.
• Minimal risk, as the emulated services control what attackers can and
cannot do.
Disadvantages
• Captures limited amounts of information, mainly transactional data
and some limited interaction.
Table 2.6: High-interaction honeypots: Advantages vs Disadvantages [44].
High-interaction: No emulation, real operating systems and services are provided
Advantages
• Able to capture far more information, including new tools, communi-
cations, or attacker keystrokes.
• No assumptions on how an attacker will behave; provides an open
environment capturing all activity.
Disadvantages
• Can be complex to install or deploy (commercial versions tend to be
much simpler).
• Increased risk, as attackers are provided real operating systems to
interact with.
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Honeypots are further characterized according to security goals: prevention,
detection, reaction and research [44]. Prevention honeypots are designed to stop the
attacker from attacking the production system by employing IP address deception,
network attack simulations, and information deception. Detection honeypots provide
real-time alerts based on system activity rather than known signatures as with a typical
IDS. Reaction honeypots accompany a production system and mirror their setup with the
primary function to identify exploitations and patch vulnerabilities. Research honeypots
are designed to invite malicious attacks by incorporating common vulnerabilities and OS
security holes.
2.4.2 Honeynet Project.
The Honeynet project began in 1999 as a research activity to evaluate and explore the
use of honeypots and honeynets to increase the knowledge of attackers’ behaviors,
motivations, attack tools, and other relevant vulnerability data [28]. In 2004, the honeynet
project was expanded to include ICS honeypots with the primary goal of determining the
feasibility of designing a software framework to simulate a variety of industrial networks
and devices [16]. Necessary requirements for the framework included:
• A targetable platform capable of allowing users to gather data on attacker trends and
tools.
• A scriptable industrial protocol simulator to test a live protocol implementation.
• Research countermeasures, such as device hardening, stack obfuscation, reducing
application information, and the effectiveness network access controls.
In 2005, the project culminated in a PLC honeynet developed by Venkat Pothamsetty
and Matthew Franz from the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Group (CIAG). The PLC
honeynet utilized Honeyd to simulate standard PLC services: TCP/IP stack of an
Ethernet-based device, Modbus services, SNMP, Telnet, file transfer protocol (FTP), and
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) [16]. Honeyd is a low-interaction honeypot developed
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by Niels Provos capable of simulating a virtual computer system at the network level [44].
Perhaps most importantly, Honeyd is capable of implementing python scripts simulating
basic PLC device service interaction. The CIAG PLC honeynet offers a basic framework
for ICS honeypots, but the reliance on Honeyd limits overall device interaction. In
addition, Honeyd’s device service scripting utilizes a python HTML implementation
which inhibits the ability to mimic service such as the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix web
server. While the CIAG PLC honeynet provided a basis for future ICS honeypot research,
the project is no longer maintained.
2.4.3 Digital Bond SCADA Honeynet.
In 2006, Digital Bond created a virtual PLC honeynet providing both a monitoring
system and a simulated PLC target device, designed to aid researchers in understanding
the potential risks of exposed control system devices [13]. Figure 2.6 details the virtual
honeynet consisting of two virtual machines (VMs), a Target VM and a Honeywall VM,
running on a single host using VMware. All incoming and outgoing traffic is captured by
the Honeywall acting as a transparent bridge. Management is designed for remote access
directly to Honeywall for reports and raw packet captures.
The Generation III Honeywall includes Snort IDS in packet capture mode, Digital
Bond SCADA IDS signatures, Sebek, Argus, Walleye, and MySQL [13]. Honeywall
report generation includes top ten scanned ports, the top ten remote IPs, the number of
packets in and out of the network, and the total number of Snort alerts generated. The
target ICS device uses Honeyd to simulate a Schneider Modicon Quantum PLC and
expose several basic services to include: Modbus TCP, Telnet, FTP, HTTP, and SNMP.
Table 2.5 outlines the available services provided by the target system as well as a brief
description of their purpose.
Later updates to the Digital Bond honeynet included the ability to utilize a physical
ICS device rather than the simulated target system.
27
Figure 2.6: Digital Bond SCADA honeynet architecture [13].
Table 2.7: Digital Bond ICS honeynet target system services [13].
Service Port Purpose
FTP tcp/21 Firmware/Device Management
Telnet tcp/23 Device Configuration/Management
HTTP tcp/80 Device Configuration/Management
SNMP udp/161 Device/Service Health/Statistics
Modbus TCP tcp/502 Monitoring and Control
VxWorks Debugger tcp/17185 Device Debugger
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2.4.4 The Honeynet Project - Conpot.
In 2013, the Honeynet Project released their first ICS honeypot, Conpot, supporting
Modbus and SNMP protocols [25]. The default configuration of Conpot simulates a basic
Siemens SIMATIC S7-200 PLC. This project has been deployed worldwide in an effort to
identify attack vectors for ICS devices. One such long-term deployment from the United
Kingdom Honeynet Project Chapter includes 43 low interaction sensors, resulting in over
2,000,000 attacks and 36,000 attacker IPs in 2012 alone [25]. Note that this open-source
venture relies on a community of volunteer security experts and lacks reliable source for
support, to include basic tool upgrades to match recent operating system standards.
2.4.5 Iowa State University.
In 2011, an Iowa State University student deployed the Digital Bond SCADA
honeynet to measure specific ICS device targeting in a post-Stuxnet world [51]. The
Digital Bond honeynet was deployed for 38 days using a single server to host the Digital
Bond Honeywall and simulated Modicon PLC. Data collection included raw packet
captures and intrusion detection reports generated by the Digital Bond Honeywall. Figure
2.7 details the honeynet architecture. The primary goal was to identify SCADA PLC
specific targeting. Of particular interest was any interaction with the Modbus or VxWorks
Debugger services, TCP port 502 and user datagram protocol (UDP) port 17185.
The findings were categorized into SCADA specific attacks and traditional IT
attacks. While the research did not identify any instances of SCADA specific targeting,
numerous traditional IT attacks were identified targeting the PLC. Figure 2.8 outlines the
details of traditional IT targeting of the Modicon PLC.
This research was primarily limited by the deployment location. The honeypot was
deployed internal to the Iowa State University and behind university network defenses. As
a result, the majority of device interaction is assumed to have occurred by university
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Figure 2.7: Iowa State University Digital Bond SCADA honeynet deployment architecture
[51].
students or staff. It was also noted the deployment network functions as the university
cyber attack educational testing network, which may account for the type and level of
Snort alerts and as well as limited ICS specific device interaction.
2.4.6 Trendmicro.
In 2013, Kyle Wilhoit, Trendmicro researcher, published a series of reports detailing
his efforts to expose malicious targeting of Internet-facing ICSs [29]. Wilhoit’s first
honeynet deployment lasted 28 days and included three honeypots deployed in
geographically-separated locations throughout the United States. Table 2.8 provides
details of each honeypot. The first honeypot provided a simulated water pressure station
via Honeyd implementation. The second honeypot simulated a HMI via a physical server
running PLC software. The third honeypot simulated a factory temperature control system
via a physical PLC. Wilhotit defined an attack as anything deemed a threat to
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Figure 2.8: Research results indicating traditional IT attacks indiscriminately targeting PLC
honeypot [51].
Internet-facing ICS devices to include unauthorized access to secure areas of sites,
modifications on perceived controllers, or any attack against a protocol specific to ICS
devices [52].
Wilhoit’s deployment included tactics for optimizing the sites for searches,
publishing the sites on Google, utilizing specific server naming conventions (e.g.,
SCADA-1, SCADA-2), and seeding the devices within Shodan [53]. Wilhoit’s findings
revealed all honeypots were attacked within 18 hours of deployment and within the first
month the honeypots registered 39 attacks from 14 different countries, 12 of which were
classified as targeted attacks [53]. Attacks included: attempted Modbus traffic
modification, attempted access to secured PHP pages, attempted malware exploitation,
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Table 2.8: Wilhoit honeynet deployment: honeypot design [52].
Emulated ICS honeypot
1. Honeypot: Simulated water pressure station, high-
interaction
2. Device: Emulated PLC via Honeyd
3. Location: Virtual instance of Ubuntu Amazon EC2
4. Services: HTTP (Apache web server), Modbus, FTP
Emulated ICS honeypot
1. Honeypot: HMI, high-interaction
2. Device: Dell DL360 server running PLC software
3. Location: Physically deployed within the US
4. Services: HTTP
Physical PLC honeypot
1. Honeypot: Factory temperature control system, high-
interaction
2. Device: Triangle Research Nano-10 PLC
3. Location: Physically deployed within the US
4. Services: HTTP, Modbus
and attempted device settings manipulation. Each attack was preceded by a port scan,
following traditional network attack methodology [29]. Figure 2.9 depicts Wilhoit’s
breakdown of activity by country. In addition to attacks specifically targeting SCADA
devices, Wilhoit identified an attempt to spearphish the site administrator of one of the
honeypot devices.
In August 2013, Wilhoit’s second honeypot deployment provided evidence of a
malicious actor breaking into a simulated United States water control systems [29].
Wilhoit used a tool called the Browser Exploitation Framework, or BeEF, to gain access to
the attackers’ systems to triangulate their location using the built-in Wi-Fi cards [29].
Wilhoit’s research extended the research of Leverett and Project SHINE, providing
evidence of Internet-facing ICS targeting.
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Figure 2.9: Wilhoit honeypot targeting breakdown by country [53].
2.5 Knowledge Gaps
A threat can be defined as a marriage of capability, intent and opportunity [17]. ICS
devices are currently deployed Internet-facing [6, 30], Shodan is able to identify these
devices, and evidence shows Internet-facing ICSs are being attacked [52]. By all
indications Shodan should be categorized as a threat to Internet-facing ICSs, however,
there is a lack of empirical evidence linking Internet-facing device targeting as a result of
Shodan. More precisely, what is the utilization of Shodan as a reconnaissance tool for ICS
device targeting?
2.6 Summary
United States critical infrastructure security is defined by the underlying ICSs
security and the device exposure. ICSs are inherently fragile due to legacy equipment,
inability to conduct traditional network security, and contrasting security priorities
between ICS security and traditional IT security professionals. ICS trending shows a
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proliferation of ICS and a dramatic shift to increase device availability and connectivity,
while sacrificing overall device security. The demand for connectivity has extended
beyond internal networking and direct access via corporate network to direct
Internet-facing deployment. Research using the Shodan computer search engine identified
thousands of ICS devices directly Internet-facing. Shodan, while not specifically designed
to identify ICS devices, provides a passive reconnaissance tool capable of identifying ICS
devices down to the specific make and model. Additional research provided evidence of
malicious ICS exploitation, wherein actors attempted to exploit an ICS honeypot
simulating a United States water utility. The threat of ICS exploitation is real; devices are
deployed Internet-facing with default or weak authentication and Shodan is capable of
identifying these devices. As such, this research attempts to fill the intelligence gap by
evaluating the impact of Shodan on Internet-facing ICS device security.
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III. Methodology
This chapter discusses the goals, approach, design and implementation of the
honeypots used to evaluate the impact of the Shodan computer search engine on
Internet-facing ICS devices.
3.1 Problem Definition
Strategically, the intent of this research is to evaluate Shodan’s impact on
Internet-facing ICS device security by deploying a series of unsolicited, high-interaction
ICS honeypots. The primary goals are to evaluate Shodan indexing functionality, contrast
network activity levels as a result of Shodan identification, and enumerate any ICS
specific targeting and attacks. Shodan indexing functionality is evaluated by determining
Shodan’s scanning routine, scanning frequency, and web database identification
timeliness. Network activity is analyzed by measuring TCP connections, total TCP packet
count, and the number of unique IP addresses interacting with each device. ICS specific
targeting is evaluated by visual packet inspection and Snort IDS analysis with known ICS
signatures. Visual packet inspection will identify device reconnaissance and unauthorized
access to secure areas of the web management console. It is hypothesized Shodan will
scan and index all devices within 30 days and further hypothesized post identification,
each device will receive an increase in network activity, to include targeted ICS attacks.
The foundation of the Shodan computer search engine is a searchable database
containing service banners for Internet accessible devices. Therefore, the secondary goal
is to assess the impact of ICS device service banner data relative to device identification
within Shodan and subsequently evaluate the ability to limit Shodan device exposure via
banner manipulation. The service banner’s impact is evaluated by comparing the number
of targeted attacks as a result of Shodan identification of two honeypots, one presenting an
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enticing service banner directly identifying the device make and model, while the second
honeypot alters the service banner to obfuscate the device. It is hypothesized the honeypot
presenting a more enticing service banner will see an increase in targeted attacks post
Shodan identification as compared to both the standard and Obfuscated honeypots.
This research extends previous efforts to evaluate Internet-facing ICS device
vulnerability by measuring the impact of the Shodan computer search engine. Specifically,
this research presents an in-depth understanding of Shodan indexing functionality,
develops a timeline for scanning, reveals the impact of Shodan identification on device
network activity levels, and enumerates ICS specific targeting. In addition, this research
evaluates the ability to limit device exposure by service banner manipulation. This data is
critical to security professionals when crafting a defense strategy for ICS security.
3.2 Approach
To achieve the aforementioned goals, a honeynet comprised of four high-interaction
honeypots is deployed unsolicited, Internet-facing, and co-located with an ICS integrator
network. Each honeypot is representative of devices currently identifiable via Shodan. In
addition, the devices are configured with default authentication settings to simulate newly
deployed PLC devices and attract the broadest level of interaction. The honeynet is
comprised of standard PLCs and banner mangled PLCs. The standard PLCs represent a
baseline comparable to devices currently identifiable via Shodan, allowing the research
results to indicate potential patterns across a larger population. The banner mangled
honeypots measure the security implications of service banner data revealed by ICS
devices. Data analysis and evaluation expands the understanding of Shodan’s scanning
functionality, compares network activity post Shodan identification, details ICS device
targeting as a result of Shodan identification, and assesses the ability to limit device
exposure via banner manipulation.
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3.3 Motivation
ICS security is vital to United States national security due to their role in monitoring
and controlling a majority of critical infrastructure systems supporting oil and gas
pipelines, water distribution systems, electrical power grids, nuclear plants, and other
manufacturing operations. Stuxnet [34] and David-Besse [47] offer historical examples of
the ramifications of ICS exploitation. Stuxnet was a sophisticated, targeted attack
infiltrating the deepest depths of the network, while David-Besse depicts the effects of a
traditional network worm on an ICS network. The work of Leverett [30] and Project
SHINE [6] demonstrate that critical infrastructure ICS devices are Internet-facing and
readily identifiable via the Shodan computer search engine. Understanding the
implications of targeted attacks against United States critical infrastructure ICSs, this
research presents an investigation into the impact of Shodan on ICS security, specifically
measuring network activity of Internet-facing devices as a result of Shodan identification.
In addition, this research evaluates the ability to limit Shodan device exposure via service
banner manipulation.
3.4 Setup and Deployment
Deploying a honeypot requires methodical planning, preparation, and understanding
of the motivations for deployment [44]. Seven key decisions are required when planning
honeypot deployment: location, deployment length, honeypot type, design configuration,
setup validation, data collection, and evaluation.
3.4.1 Location.
Honeynet deployment is highly dependent on available resources and research intent.
This research uses high-interaction honeypots (i.e., physical devices) which precludes any
virtual deployment locations such as the Amazon cloud. Locations considered for
deployment include co-location with device manufacturers, ICS integrators, live ICS
production enclaves, commercial business class IP space, and residential IP space. In
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order to represent the most realistic honeypot it serves to deploy the honeypots co-located
in a venue in some form associated with ICSs, removing the options of commercial or
residential IP space. This research seeks to evaluate Shodan’s impact on live production
ICSs controlling critical infrastructure, therefore deployment co-located with device
manufacturers is excluded. The resulting options include ICS integrators and live
production environments. The honeynet is not co-located with live production
environments primarily because of the inability to guarantee the devices would not
interfere with the surrounding ICS environment. Additionally, the available production
environment network architecture prevents the devices from direct Internet accessibility.
Finally, this research is designed to attract the broadest swath of device interaction and, as
such, would potentially draw unwanted malicious activity to the real-world ICSs, an
unacceptable risk to live United States critical infrastructure.
The final option for deployment is co-location with an ICS integrator. ICS integrators
specialize in bringing together multiple facets of ICS component subsystems into a single
functioning system. This includes vendor coordination, system assembly, installation,
maintenance, and security [11]. This location offers a unique opportunity to evaluate
device targeting in a location prior to live ICS deployment. In the broader scope of ICS
targeting, the ICS integrator offers a prime location for exploitation as they represent the
middleman between the manufacturer and live production environment, a single choke
point for the exploitation of multiple ICS venues. In addition, the ability to compromise a
device at this juncture in the supply chain allows attackers to potentially defeat any
network defenses at the production site. Note that the integrator has requested to remain
anonymous due to certain sensitivities.
3.4.2 Deployment Length.
Shodan functions as a search engine designed to identify Internet-facing devices by
continuously scanning the entire Internet. The deployment period for this research is
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based on two factors: previous research and an approximation of the time required to scan
all IPv4 addresses. Previous ICS honeypot research deployed honeypots for 26 to 90 days,
with the primary focus of identifying attacks against Internet-facing ICS devices [51, 53].
To approximate the amount of time required to scan all public IPv4 address, this research
utilized the Online Internet Scanning Calculator provided by networcon.com, which bases
calculations on a single TCP SYN scan for a single port, while accounting for packet size,
throughput, and total target IPv4 addresses (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Honeypot deployment length [37].
Packet Size (TCP SYN)
20 bytes (IPv4 header) + 20 bytes (TCP header)
+ 14 bytes (Ethernet header) = 74 bytes
Throughput 1600 packets per second
Packets per Probe 1 (Single TCP SYN) probe
Target IPv4 Addresses 3,706,584,832
Ports 1 port probed
The Online Internet Scanning Calculator estimated a scan of all public IPv4 address
would require 26 days and 19 hours (Equation 3.1). Previous research set the minimum
and maximum values for the deployment, while the scan approximation offered an
empirical calculation ensuring the devices would be scanned once at a minimum. For
sufficiency, this research uses a 55 day deployment period to account for double the
estimated time required to scan all IPv4 addresses and accounting for the mean honeypot
deployment of previous research.
Time approximation to scan all public IPv4 addresses:
3, 706, 584, 832 IPv4 addresses × 1 probe
1, 600 packetssecond × 86, 400 secondsday
≈ 26 days 19 hours (3.1)
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3.4.3 Honeypot Type.
This research utilizes high-interaction research honeypots. As with all honeypots, the
goal is to present the most realistic honeypot possible relative to the target environment
and data desired. To-date, the low-interaction honeypot options do not provide an
adequate level of device interaction necessary to represent the desired dataset and
environment. A high-interaction honeypot provides the ability to interact with a fully
functioning physical PLC device.
3.4.4 Design Configuration.
A primary tenet of honeypot design is that the honeypot should strive to look like a
production asset [20]. This research utilizes the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC. The
design is based on a generic characterization of Allen-Bradley devices identifiable via
Shodan. This research uses the Allen-Bradley PLC due to its notoriety as one of Northern
America’s primary PLC suppliers. As of 2013, in North America Rockwell/Allen-Bradley
maintained 60% to 70% of the market share in both original equipment manufacturer and
end-user markets [2]. Figure 3.1 details the November 2013 market analysis by the ARC
Advisory Group, a global market research firm for automation, asset management and
control.
As the intent of each honeypot is to represent those devices currently identifiable via
Shodan, an investigation into the Allen-Bradley devices currently indexed by Shodan is
required. An inspection of the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756 eWeb PLC web
management service banner uncovered a basic Shodan query signature identifying 490
devices currently indexed by Shodan. A random sampling of 49 devices, roughly 10%, is
used to design the honeypot configuration for this research. Each device is inspected to
identify nine characteristics: CPU type, CPU firmware version, Ethernet module type,
Ethernet module firmware version, naming conventions, number of modules, type of
modules, chassis size, and available services. These characteristics are identified via basic
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Figure 3.1: ARC market analysis of North American PLC suppliers [2].
reconnaissance of the web management console and a TCP network mapper (NMAP)
scan of the device to determine the available services. A TCP scan attempts to open a
connection to any available services on the target machine. The NMAP option “-p
1-65535” sets the scan to query all ports. At no point did this research connect to any
secured areas of public devices, nor did reconnaissance include direct interaction with
EtherNet/IP ports beyond the aforementioned service scan. Figure 3.2 depicts the web
management console of a randomly selected Shodan identified device. The web
management console provides the majority of device characterization data utilized to
develop the honeypot design to include: device name, description, Ethernet Address,
product revision, firmware version date, serial number status, and uptime. Note due to
sensitivity concerns, identifiable information has been redacted in the figure.
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Figure 3.2: Allen-Bradley web management console - Random Shodan Sample.
Figure 3.3 depicts the browse chassis section of the web management console,
identifying the associated modules and size of the chassis. Figure 3.4 shows the results of
an NMAP scan of the same device and the available service: web management (port 80)
and EtherNet/IP (port 44818).
Figure 3.3: Allen-Bradley web management console - Browse Chassis.
The honeypot configuration is designed to offer the a realistic representation of
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs currently identifiable via Shodan. Table 3.2 details
results for each characteristic relative to the sampled dataset.
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Table 3.2: Shodan Allen-Bradley PLC characteristics.
CPU type
• 1756-L55 LOGIX5555
• 1756-L61 LOGIX5561
• 1756-L62S LOGIX5562
• 1769-L23E LOGIX5323E
• 11769-L35E LOGIX5335E
CPU Firmware version • 13.x, 15.x,16.x, 17.x, 18.x, 19.x, 20.x
Ethernet Module
• 1769 Ethernet Port
• ENBT Ethernet Module
• eWeb Web Server Module
Ethernet Module Firmware version • 5.xxx, 6.xxx, 9.xxx, 13.xxx
Naming Convention
• Control System name (e.g., 1769-L35E/A
LOGIX5335E)
• Ethernet Module number (e.g., 1756-
ENBT)
• Descriptor (e.g., xxx Processing EWEB)
Number of Modules • 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9
Type of Modules
• CPU module
• Ethernet
• I\O Communications
• SERCOS interface
• DC Input module
• DC Output module
• Output Module (Isolated Relay)
Chassis Size • 5, 7, 10, 13
Available Services
• Web Server (port 80)
• SNMP (161)
• EtherNet/IP (44818)
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Figure 3.4: Nmap scan - random Shodan sample.
In addition to the basic characteristics cited above, it is noted that every device in the
sample set is configured with a processor and Ethernet module installed in the first two
available slots of the chassis. Within the sample dataset, 95% of devices are configured
with the processor installed in the first slot (Slot 00) and the Ethernet module in the
second slot (Slot 01).
3.4.4.1 Honeypot Configuration.
The nine characteristics provide a general device representation for the Allen-Bradley
ControlLogix PLC. Based on the collected data and available resources, each honeypot is
comprised of the following:
1. CPU type - Allen Bradley 1756-L61 ControlLogix Logix5561
2. Control System Firmware version - Revision 19.052.
3. Ethernet Module type - 1756-EWeb Ethernet Module.
4. Ethernet Module Firmware version- Revision 5.001.
5. Naming Convention - Descriptive (e.g., ab.2013.water.sX).
6. Number of Modules - 2.
7. Type of Modules - CPU module, Ethernet module.
8. Chassis Size - 4 Slot Chassis (CPU in slot 00 and Ethernet module in slot 01).
9. Available Services - Web Server (port 80), EtherNet/IP (44818).
Each PLC is assigned a static IP address directly accessible via the Internet. Each
PLC is loaded with basic ladder logic to simulate a functioning PLC. The ladder logic
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downloaded to each honeypot is a derivation of a sample temperature control application
provided by Allen-Bradley RSlogix 5000, designed to take an analog input from a
temperature sensor and control an analog output to a heating element. The application is
altered to function on the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61 with firmware revision
19.052. In addition, I/O dependencies are removed and an internal application task
simulates all data inputs.
Project SHINE highlighted not only the accessibility of numerous ICS devices, but
also identified that numerous devices utilized weak or default authentication. As such, the
web management interface is configured with default authentication settings to mimic a
newly deployed PLC. Default PLC configuration allows the honeypots to assume the
broadest range of targeting and represents “low hanging fruit” for exploitation. Each
device is named ab.2013.water.s[honeypot number] with device description
plc.water.s[honeypot number] and location site [honeypot number]. This naming
convention is intended to enhance the realism of the honeypots and entice targeting by
suggesting the devices are located in association with a water utility production enclave.
Figure 3.5 shows one of the honeypot web management consoles detailing specifics about
the device.
As shown in Figure 3.6, the honeynet design consists of four high-interaction
honeypots: two standard PLCs and two PLCs with mangled banners. All PLCs are
deployed Internet-facing with static IP addresses in the same subnet and configured with
the same settings and default authentication. A single connection from the ICS
integrator’s switch is run to a 3COM Office Connect 8-port Dual Speed hub hosting the
four honeypots and data collection laptop. The standard honeypot PLCs are representative
of the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix devices identifiable via Shodan, while the banner
mangled honeypots seek to measure the impact of the service banner data on post Shodan
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Figure 3.5: High-interaction honeypot web management interface.
identification. The honeypots also evaluate the ability to limit device exposure via banner
manipulation. All honeypots expose two services to attackers:
1. HTTP (port 80) web administrative interface. The web interface is available to
anyone accessing the service and requires the default credentials
(administrator:null).
2. EtherNet/IP and Common Industrial Protocol (port 44818) communications
protocols originally developed by Rockwell Automation for use in process control
and industrial automation applications.
These represent the two most basic services offered by the Allen-Bradley
ControlLogix PLC and the primary services required for device deployment within a
production environment. In addition, these services represent the only two services found
on every ControlLogix device from the sample set of Allen-Bradley devices currently
indexed via Shodan. The web server provides access to information from the control
46
Figure 3.6: Deployment and setup co-located with ICS integrator.
system using a web browser, while also allowing remote control system monitoring and
modification. The EtherNet/IP service provides remote control and management of the
device. Figure 3.7 depicts the available services as noted via the web management
console. Note that the two services represented as CIP are associated with one service
running on port 44818. Access to this section of the web management console requires the
default username and password.
Figure 3.8 depicts a NMAP service scan of the honeypots detailing open ports and
services as 80 and 44818, while also detailing with 93% accuracy the device as a Rockwell
Automation 1769-L23E-QB1 PLC based on NMAP’s device fingerprinting service. Note
the scan for all four honeypots yielded the same results. NMAP device fingerprinting is
based on a comparison of device responses to specific TCP/IP probes and open TCP or
UDP ports. An investigation into the NMAP fingerprint database reveals that the only
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Figure 3.7: Available services provided by honeypots viewed via web management console.
Allen-Bradley device is the Allen-Bradley 1769-L23E, explaining misidentification of the
Allen-Bradley model. While the NMAP fingerprint miscategorizes the model number, it
presents the attacker with an indication of the device type (i.e., Allen-Bradley) and
information pertinent to begin reconnaissance (i.e., open ports and banner description).
3.4.4.2 Standard Honeypots.
Standard honeypots measure the impact of Shodan on Internet-facing ICS devices.
The two standard honeypots consist of an Allen Bradley 1756-L61 ControlLogix 5561
revision 19.052 with eWeb Ethernet module revision 5.001, four slot chassis, and DC
power supply. Standard honeypots are configured with a static Internet-facing IP address
concurrent to the ICS integrator’s corporate network. Figure 3.9 outlines the basic
network setup for the standard honeypots, wherein the standard honeypots consist of an
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC connected to the ICS integrator’s switch via a hub. Note
all honeypots are connected to a single hub as represented in Figure 3.6. This
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Figure 3.8: NMAP scan of Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 5561 PLC.
configuration facilitates the ability to have a single monitoring laptop conduct full packet
captures for all devices.
Figure 3.10 shows the web management console homepage detailing device name,
description, Ethernet Address, IP address, product revision, firmware version date, serial
number status, and uptime. Standard honeypots are programmed with a basic ladder logic
to simulate activity. Name resolution is enabled on each PLC and configured with public
DNS servers, primary 209.244.0.3 and secondary 209.244.0.4.
3.4.4.3 Banner Mangled Honeypots.
Shodan offers users a searchable database of Internet accessible devices and any
banners associated to those devices [43]. This mechanism supposes the greatest threat to
device identification lies in the information revealed by device service banners. In order to
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Figure 3.9: Standard honeypot design.
Figure 3.10: Standard honeypot web management console.
assess the impact of ICS device service banner data relative to identification within
Shodan, two honeypots are deployed with altered service banners, one indicating the
device model and one obfuscating the device by removing Allen-Bradley ControlLogix
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PLC indicators. This design also evaluates the ability to disguise a PLC from Shodan
query discovery and signature development. Both banner mangled honeypots are
configured with the same specifications as the standard honeypots, consisting of an Allen
Bradley 1756-L61 ControlLogix 5561 CPU with firmware revision 19.052, eWeb Ethernet
module revision 5.001, four slot chassis, and DC power supply. Banner mangled
honeypots are configured with static Internet-facing IP address concurrent to the standard
honeypots. To manipulate the device service banner a transparent bridge is inserted
between the physical PLC and the Internet, altering any outgoing service banners (Figure
3.11).
Figure 3.11: Banner mangled honeypot transparent bridge implementation.
The transparent bridge is designed using a Raspberry Pi configured with Linux
IPtables and bridge-utils to bridge the on board Ethernet card and a second USB Ethernet
adapter. A Raspberry Pi is a credit-card-sized single-board computer running a version of
Debian Linux. There are two different banner mangled honeypot implementations:
Obfuscated and Advertised. Both use Python implementations to inspect outbound traffic
from the PLC and alter any packets containing specific banner data. In the case of the
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Obfuscated honeypot, the default Allen-Bradley 1756-L61 ControlLogix 5561 PLC port
80 banner Server: Go Ahead-Webs is replaced with a random string to obfuscate the
device and limit exposure. The Advertised honeypot utilizes banner mangling to make the
device more readily identifiable by replacing the default banner Server: Go
Ahead-Webs with Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756. As a result, once the PLC is
indexed by Shodan, any query for Allen-Bradley, ControlLogix and/or 1756 should reveal
the Advertised PLC. Figure 3.12 illustrates the comparison between the default,
Obfuscated, and Advertised honeypot banner grabs.
Figure 3.12: Transparent bridge banner manipulation.
3.4.5 Setup Validation.
Prior to deployment, each honeypot device is evaluated in a lab environment to
ensure the devices are correctly configured. The testing environment consists of a closed
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private network containing a hub, the four honeypots, and a data collection laptop. Each
honeypot is assessed according to NMAP scans, web server interaction, EtherNet/IP
accessibility and functionality. Once online, each device is scanned using NMAP to
determine available services while also obtaining a device fingerprint. Each device is then
assessed via web management interface traversal to ensure all setting and configurations
are accurate relative to the predetermined device design. This includes: available services,
default authentication, and naming conventions. Finally, each device is tested to confirm
EtherNet/IP protocols are available and the ladder logic is accessible. EtherNet/IP
validation is accomplished using the Allen-Bradley RSLogix 5000 software to access the
ladder logic loaded to each device, confirming the ability to upload, download, and make
changes.
Once deployed, each device is again scanned via NMAP to generate a device
fingerprint for comparison with the secured lab environment fingerprint. Each device is
scanned daily using a Python script to conduct a banner grab of port 80, specifically
recording the banner date and time. Results are stored according to IP address, date,
banner date and time. If the device is unresponsive the script returns the IP address, date
and a message stating “IP address X.X.X.X unresponsive.” Banner grabs are conducted
using the netcat command in combination with grep to filter for the service banner date
and time.
3.4.6 Data Collection.
A network monitor, Dell Precision M4500 running Ubuntu 12.04, is deployed
alongside the honeynet to conduct full packet captures of all traffic destined for target
devices. The monitor utilizes TCPdump for packet capture and SSH for remote packet
collection. TCPdump is a Linux command line packet analyzer capable of intercepting
TCP/IP packets transmitted or received over the network. The network monitor laptop is
connected via CAT5 cable to the network hub collecting all traffic. Ethernet hubs connect
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multiple devices together acting as a single network segment. Subsequently, the network
monitor collects traffic for all four honeypots. The monitoring laptop is configured with no
external Ethernet IP address to prohibit identification by actors interacting with the
honeypots. The monitoring laptop is configured for remote capture exfiltration via the ICS
integrator wireless network. A packet capture bash script executes the TCPdump
command every night at midnight, creating a capture file for each day. Below is a generic
representation of the TCPdump commands used to capture network traffic for this
research.
• tcpdump -i eth1 not host 1.2.3.4 -w capture.pcap
TCPdump monitors all traffic on the system interface eth1 and outputs the resulting
network capture to file “capture.pcap.” TCPdump was tested to determine packet accuracy
and packet loss. At the end of each capture, TCPdump provides the total packets captured,
packets received by filter, and packets dropped by kernel. To test TCPdump, a 1.5GB
sample pcap file was obtained from Netresec.com publicly available files. TCPreplay was
used to replay the pcap and TCPdump was used to capture the traffic. In this lab
experiment, TCPdump indicated zero packets dropped by kernel. A study completed by
the University of Michigan tested the effects of systematic packet loss on aggregate TCP
flows, where in TCPdump was used to collect every packet transmitted and received. Over
a two day period, the study observed 9,263 losses out of 62,379,519 total packets, yielding
a loss rate of 0.01% [21]. These two experiments provide the validation for the TCPdump
tool.
The backend analysis utilizes the Tshark processor provided by Wireshark to
evaluate traffic destined for each individual honeypot. The command below represents a
Tshark command to read in the daily packet capture and output all traffic relative to a
single honeypot.
• tshark -r input.pcap -w output.pcap -R “ip.addr == 1.2.3.5”
54
To determine when a device is indexed via Shodan, this research utilizes the Shodan
API to query Shodan for the specific host (i.e., IP address). This script queries the Shodan
database twice daily. This script stores IP address, date, and the device service banner as
identified by the Shodan database. If the device has not been indexed, the script returns IP
address, date, and the message “no results.” Any successful query of the Shodan database
is followed by a visual inspection of the Shodan web interface to determine if the device is
identifiable. In addition, an inspection of the raw packet capture from the monitor laptop
is conducted to correlate time and date stamp for the indexing. Figure 3.13 depicts a
comparison between the raw packet identified via visual packet inspection in Wireshark
and the data available via Shodan web interface.
Figure 3.13: Wireshark visual packet inspection of Shodan successful device index.
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3.5 Evaluation
This research evaluates the impact of the Shodan computer search engine on
Internet-facing ICS devices by examining Shodan indexing functionality, network activity,
and malicious activity targeting the honeytpots.
3.5.1 Indexing Functionality.
Prior to analyzing the network activity, it is critical to define Shodan’s indexing
functionality. Shodan indexing functionality is evaluated by measuring the time from
initial deployment to: the initial Shodan service interrogation; first successful web
management index; Shodan web interface identification; and subsequent successful
indexes (i.e., Shodan indexing frequency) (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Metrics for evaluating Shodan device scanning and indexing functionality.
Indexing Functionality
1. Initial Shodan service interrogation (days)
2. 1st successful web managsement banner indexing (days)
3. Device identifiable via Shodan web interface (days)
4. Shodan indexing frequency (days)
Analysis measures the amount of time from initial deployment to the first Shodan
service interrogation. In personal communications with Matherly, he revealed Shodan
operates by randomly selecting an IP address, then randomly selecting a service from a set
of services for interrogation. Therefore, Shodan’s initial scan may interrogate a service
not offered by the device resulting in an unsuccessfully index; however, this measurement
marks the earliest possible opportunity for a device to be indexed.
This research then measures the amount of time a newly connected device is online
before it is successfully indexed by Shodan. A successful scan is defined by the
interrogation and banner grab of an available service. For this research, a successful scan
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is achieved by the interrogation of the web server (port 80), as the honeypot devices are
configured to offer web management and EtherNet/IP (port 44818), Shodan is not
currently designed to interrogate EtherNet/IP.
This research then measures the amount of time between device deployment and the
point when the device is identifiable via the Shodan web interface. Shodan offers two
methods for device identification, web interface and API. When Shodan successfully
scans a device, the data is compiled in the Shodan database, but is not immediately
available via the web interface. Therefore, this measurement defines the point at which a
device is most widely identifiable via both Shodan API and web interface, offering device
identification to both sophisticated and basic users.
Finally, this research examines the frequency of Shodan indexing by recording the
number of successful indexes over the 55 day deployment period. This provides insight
into how frequently Internet-facing devices are scanned by Shodan.
3.5.2 Network Activity.
This research compares the network activity levels of each device as a result of
Shodan identification. Network activity is defined as TCP connections, total TCP packets,
and unique IP addresses interacting with the honeypot. Shodan identification is defined as
the date a honeypot is first identifiable via the Shodan web interface. This delineation
serves to divide network traffic for each honeypot into two datasets: pre-identification and
post-identification. Each dataset (i.e., pre-identification and post-identification) is further
subdivided into seven day subsets. The seven day period accounts for a standardized
amount of network traffic for analysis. For the pre-identification, seven days subsets are
determined by counting back from the date of web interface identification. For the
post-identification, seven day subsets are determined by counting forward from the date of
web interface identification. Figure 3.14 provides an example of network activity dataset
determination. In this example, the honeypot was Shodan web interface identifiable on the
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twentieth day of deployment. The pre-identification dataset is broken into three subsets:
Pre1, Pre2, and Pre3. The post-identification dataset is broken into five subsets: Post1,
Post2, Post3, Post4, and Post5.
Figure 3.14: Network activity subdivision for analysis.
Network activity comparative analysis is conducted using linear trending, subset
mean averages, and one-tailed pairwise t-tests. Linear trending is examined over the full
55 day deployment and offers a method of characterizing the overall change, while also
quantifying the magnitude of change. Linear smoothing, also known as moving mean
calculation, is used to account for variances in network activity and is calculated using a
seven day moving mean. Linear trending is accompanied with an r-squared value
indicating the “goodness of fit” [40]. The goodness of fit value ranges from 0 to 1,
wherein an r-squared value of 1 indicates a perfect fit to the linear trend. Note the
goodness of fit does not relate to the statistical significance of the trend line; statistical
significance is determine by t-tests.
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Analysis compares the mean averages for pre-identification subsets to the mean
averages for post-identification subsets using a 95% confidence interval (e.g., Pre1
compared to Post1, Pre1 compared to Post2, Pre1 compared to Post3). A comparison of
mean averages reveals if Shodan identification results in an increase in network activity.
For example, if all post-identification mean averages fall above pre-identification mean
averages, accounting for a margin of error represented by a 95% confidence interval, then
the observed difference in network can potentially be attributed to Shodan identification.
A t-test is a statistical significance test used to determine if two sets of data are
significantly different from each other [40]. This research seeks to identify any increase in
activity post Shodan identification and as such utilizes a one-tailed t-test which
specifically tests the relationship between two datasets in a single direction. Analysis uses
a pairwise t-test, wherein each pre-identification subset is compared to every
post-identification subset (e.g., Pre1 compared to Post1, Pre1 compared to Post2, Pre1
compared to Post3). Note pairwise t-tests require sample sizes of equal size, therefore
pre-identification and post-identification subsets containing less than seven days will not
be used for statistical significance testing. A t-test results in a p-value ranging from 0 to 1.
This value indicates whether the null hypothesis should be rejected relative to the
predefined confidence interval. This research hypothesizes that Shodan honeypot
identification results in an increase in network activity, as such the null hypothesis is that
Shodan identification “does not” result in an increase in network activity. This research
uses a 95% confidence interval, therefore to reject the null hypothesis the t-test must result
in a p-values less than 0.05. Table 3.4 provides an overview of the network activity
metrics used to measure the impact of Shodan.
3.5.3 ICS Specific Targeting.
The essence of a honeypot assumes all device interaction is malicious, as the device
is non-production and should receive no legitimate traffic. It is also assumed any device
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Table 3.4: Network activity evaluation metrics.
Linear Trending
(55 day period)
1. TCP connections
2. TCP packet count
3. Unique IPs
Subset Mean Averages
(Pre/Post-identification)
1. TCP connections
2. TCP packet count
3. Unique IPs
Subset Pairwise T-test
(Pre/Post-identification)
1. TCP connections
2. TCP packets
3. Unique IPs
directly connected to the Internet will receive a level of suspicious and malicious
interaction and targeting. This research focuses on ICS specific device targeting and
attacks as a result of Shodan indexing and identification. ICS specific targeting is defined
as PLC web management server reconnaissance, unauthorized access to secured areas of
the PLC web management server, any modifications or modification attempts to PLC
configurations, and any interaction or specific attacks against ICS specific protocols.
Analysis is accomplished by visual packet inspection and Snort IDS analysis.
Visual Packet Inspection. Visual packet inspection is conducted using Wireshark, a
network protocol analyzer, to reveal targeted device reconnaissance and unauthorized
access to secured areas of the PLC web management server. The web server provides
access to information from the control system using a web browser, while also allowing
remote control system monitoring and modification. Web management server
reconnaissance is defined by a manual traversal and specific site requests. The
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61 web server provides an implementation of HTML
utilizing Active Server Page (ASP) and Extensible Markup Language (XML) files. To
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identify reconnaissance activity via web management interface traversal, a visual
inspection of the network traffic identifies specific HTTP Get requests containing device
ASP files. For example, a request for the ASP file chassisWho.asp reveals an attempt to
investigate the PLC chassis, identifying the chassis size, number of modules, and specific
module identification. Figure 3.15 depicts the aforementioned request in Wireshark. Table
3.5 details the specific ASP files and their relevance.
Figure 3.15: Visual packet inspection of the GET request indicating a query of the device
chassis information.
The second evaluation of malicious device traversal is any attempt to access the
secured areas of the web management console, both successful and unsuccessful. Each
honeypot is configured with default security setting, meaning the username and password
is administrator:null. A simple Google search for Allen-Bradley ControlLogix default
authentication reveals the default username and password. A visual packet inspection
reveals authentication attempts, as well as the username. Figure 3.16 reveals a successful
login using the default credentials. This stream reveals the username “administrator” and
an attempt to access the secured device identity web page.
Snort IDS Analysis. To identify and enumerate specific ICS targeting, this research
utilizes an implementation of the Security Onion, a Linux distribution designed for
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Table 3.5: Visual Packet Inspection - device traversal.
Homepage • home.asp
Device Diagnostics
• diagover.asp
• diagnetwork.asp
• msgconnect.asp
• etherstats.asp
Device Configuration (Secured)
• identity.asp
• network.asp
• services.asp
• emailConfig.asp
User Management (Secured)
• editusers.asp
• editlimits.asp
Server Management (Secured)
• webManage
• webTime
• backupRestore.html
• serverlog.asp
Chassis Identification • chassisWho.asp
Figure 3.16: Attempt to access secured areas of the PLC web management console.
intrusion detection, network security monitoring, and log management. Tools include
Snort, Snorby, Squil, netcat, and TCPreplay [4]. In addition to the latest Snort
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implementations, this research utilized Digital Bonds Quickdraw SCADA IDS signatures
which include DNP3, EtherNet/IP, Modbus TCP, and vulnerability signatures. Digital
Bond also developed SCADA IDS preprocessors and associated Plugins for the Snort IDS
which prepare the control system protocols and communication for analysis by Snort rules
[13]. The SCADA preprocessors are designed to account for control system protocol
fragmentation and protocol state issues, extracting message objects that can be analyzed
using SCADA payload detection rule options in Snort rules [13]. Although this research
focuses on the Allen-Bradley PLC and EtherNet/IP protocol, any detection of incidents
against Modbus or DNP3 are of interest. This research is scoped to ICS devices, therefore
any alerts or malicious activity is categorized as: (i) specifically targeting ICS devices or
(ii) indiscriminate targeting of Internet-facing web servers. Snort alerts are based on the
level of priority: high, medium, or low. Targeted ICS attacks are associated with high
priority alerts as these are an indication of direct device scanning, automated tool
exploitation, privilege escalation, unauthorized device access, and unauthorized read/write
requests to a PLC [13]. Alternatively medium and low alerts are indicative of
indiscriminate Internet-facing device targeting. Comparative analysis is conducted on
total Snort alerts using linear trending, subset mean averages, and one-tailed pairwise
t-tests as an additional measurement of Shodans impact on Internet-facing ICS device
security. Table 3.5 provides an overview of the ICS specific targeting metrics.
3.5.4 Banner Impact.
This research evaluates the impact of the data revealed by the device service banner
relative to device identification via Shodan by measuring the level of specific ICS attacks
post Shodan identification. Comparative analysis is conducted between the Advertised
and Obfuscated honeypots to measure the ability to limit device exposure via banner
manipulation. In addition, this research utilizes an independent party to attempt to identify
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs using Shodan, with the specific intent of identifying
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Table 3.6: ICS specific targeting metrics.
Visual Packet Inspection
1. Basic reconnaissance
2. Secured area access
ICS Specific Targeting
(Snort IDS)
1. ICS protocol attacks
2. Privilege Escalation/Unauthorized Access
3. Device Read/Writes
Comparative Analysis
(Total Snort Alerts)
1. Linear Trending (7 day smoothing)
2. Mean Average Alerts
3. Significance Testing (t-test)
the Advertised and Obfuscated honeypots. The independent party assesses identification
by two measures: no knowledge and specific Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC banner
knowledge.
3.6 Summary
This research is intended to evaluate the impact of Shodan on Internet-facing ICS
devices by deploying unsolicited high-interaction Internet-facing ICS honeypots.
Evaluation is based on a determination of Shodan’s indexing functionality, analyzing
honeypot network activity levels post Shodan identification, and the enumeration of
targeted ICS attacks against the honeypots. In addition, this research evaluates the ability
to limit device exposure by implementing service banner manipulation.
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IV. Results and Analysis
The intent of this research is to evaluate Shodan’s impact on Internet-facing ICS
device security by deploying Internet-facing ICS honeypots. Each honeypot was deployed
unsolicited and Internet-facing for 55 days. Data was collected from daily packet captures
and analyzed using Wireshark and the Snort IDS. This chapter presents an evaluation of
Shodan indexing functionality, analysis of network activity, and identification of ICS
specific targeting.
4.1 Shodan
To understand the impact of Shodan, it is important to understand Shodan’s
functionality. Shodan is designed to identify any device linked to the Internet, including
desktop computers, servers, printers, and web cameras.
4.1.1 Shodan Functionality.
Shodan continuously scans the Internet using random functions to prevent bias of
individual networks. Shodan begins by randomly generating an IP address, then randomly
selecting a single service port to send a SYN scan. If the SYN scan to the random IP and
random service port is successful (i.e., SYN—ACK response), Shodan initiates a banner
grab and stores the resulting data in a database containing the IP address and specific
banner data. If the initial SYN scan is unsuccessful, Shodan generates a new random IP
and service port. Figure 4.1 presents a visual representation of the Shodan scanning
routine. Note that Shodan relies on Python to conduct all device scans and port
interrogation.
Shodan scans the Internet continuously and updates the database in real-time;
however, data collection rates can impact the search engine. A high level of Shodan
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Figure 4.1: Shodan device scanning routine.
website traffic can negatively impact the search engine causing the banner update to be
temporarily disabled (i.e., the ability to identify devices via web search engine queries).
Shodan offers two avenues for device identification: web interface and Shodan API.
Both the web interface and API utilize the same search engine; however, the API allows
utilization of the “host()” filter which bypasses the search engine and directly accesses the
Shodan database. The Shodan database stores device data in “Host Profiles,” providing a
device summary and available services. The device summary details the IP address,
Location (i.e., city and country), and latitudinal/longitudinal coordinates. Device services
are listed in order of the most recent scans and port services associated with the service
banner.
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Shodan documentation indicates the majority of data collection occurs from standard
services to include web-servers, FTP, SSH, and Telnet [43]. In total, Shodan
documentation indicates 40 services interrogated during network scanning, noting the
only ICS related port indexed by Shodan is SNMP (port 161). Comparing Shodan
database results and raw network captures revealed a series of IP addresses conducting
Shodan scans. A WHOIS lookup confirmed these addresses are associated with Shodan,
indicating the owner as John Matherly. Analysis of all service interrogations initiated by
Shodan IP addresses revealed seven additional undocumented services Shodan
interrogates (Table 4.1). Of particular note is port 20000, which is a standard protocol port
for DNP3. Communications with Shodan developers revealed the future addition of ICS
specific services to include Modbus (port 502) and EtherNet/IP (port 44818).
Table 4.1: Additional Shodan service interrogation ports (i.e., undocumented).
Port Service
389 LDAP
5060 VOIP using SIP
6667 IRC
9943 ivisit Video Teleconferencing
9944 Unknown
9999 Unknown
20000 DNP3
4.1.2 Device Identification.
Shodan attempts to index all Internet facing devices. Although not solely intended
for targeting ICS devices, Shodan provides a capability to identify potential ICS devices
through advanced queries. Queries are developed using a series of filters to allow users to
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extract precise lists of Internet-facing devices. Results are based on information revealed
by device service banner interrogation. Note that a service banner refers to information
provided by a system in response to a connection request. Banner grabbing is the act of
obtaining active information about a service or system through port interrogation. Figure
4.2 depicts a banner grab of an Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC web management
console on port 80. Note that due to sensitivity concerns, identifiable information has been
redacted in the figure.
Figure 4.2: Banner grab using netcat on an Allen-Bradley PLC.
To exemplify Shodan ICS device identification, Figure 4.3 presents a generic query
of Shodan for Allen-Bradley that identifies 98 devices. Further inspection of the details
for these devices reveal they are Allen-Bradley PLC models 1747 and 1785. Both PLCs
utilize SNMP with the associated SNMP service banners containing “Allen-Bradley,”
specifically Allen-Bradley 1747-L553/C SLC-5/05 Series C Revision 10
1747 slc 3.46 13-Jan-06 and Allen-Bradley 1785-L80S/C PLC5-80 Series C
Revision U.2. This illustrates Shodan search functionality as well as the impact of data
revealed by service banners. Note that other Allen-Bradley PLC models, such as
ControlLogix 1756, do not utilize SNMP and the service banners do not contain
“Allen-Bradley,” therefore they are not identified by the generic query.
This research utilizes Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs. The following provides an
exemplar as to specific Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC identification. The
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC web servers use a banner containing GoAhead-Webs
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Figure 4.3: Shodan query for Allen-Bradley.
Connection: Close index.html. A Shodan query for that text reveals 490
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC devices directly connected to the Internet (Figure 4.4).
Additionally, by default the Allen-Bradley PLCs are initialized with a date of Jan 1 1970.
As depicted in Figure 4.5, adding the year 1972 to the query further refines the results to
10 Allen-Bradley PLCs, which have likely been in operation for two years. As shown in
Figure 4.6, an inspection of the same device revealed an uptime of 981 days, just over two
and a half years.
4.2 Shodan Indexing
Shodan is designed to identify any Internet-facing device. The objective of evaluating
Shodan’s indexing functionality is to determine if, in fact, an unsolicited device will be
identified and at what rate. Shodan identification can be divided into three phases: Shodan
scan initialization, first successful banner grab, and web interface identification. Shodan
continuously scans the Internet updating device service banners. As such, this research
also examines the Shodan indexing frequency over the 55 day deployment.
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Figure 4.4: Shodan query revealing 490 Allen-Bradley ControlLogix devices.
4.2.1 Shodan Scan Initialization.
Shodan operates by randomly selecting an IP address then randomly selecting a
service for interrogation. As a result, the initial scan conducted by Shodan may not
successfully index the device if the service is not available. Regardless, this scan marks
the earliest opportunity for a device to be indexed. All four honeypots were initially
scanned by Shodan in less than four days, with the Standard1 PLC and Obfuscated PLC
scanned after one day. Note the initial scan against Standard2 resulted in a successful port
80 interrogation and banner grab. Table 4.2 details the number of days each device was
online prior to receiving the initial service scan from Shodan, as well as detailing the
initial service scanned.
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Figure 4.5: Shodan query revealing Allen-Bradley ControlLogix devices with two years in
operation.
Figure 4.6: Device inspection showing an uptime of 981 days.
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Table 4.2: Results for Shodan scan initialization timeline.
Honeypot Initial Scan Service Scanned
Standard1 1 day (24 hrs 9 min) 25 (SMTP)
Standard2 3 days (82 hrs 10 min) 80 (HTTP)
Advertised 3 days (85 hrs 53 min) 25 (SMTP)
Obfuscated 1 day (28 hrs 10 min) 443 (HTTPS)
4.2.2 First Successful Scan.
Analysis examines the amount of time a newly connected device is online before it is
successfully indexed by Shodan. A successful scan is defined by the interrogation and
banner grab of an available service. For this research, a successful scan is achieved by the
interrogation of the web server (port 80), as the honeypot devices only offer web
management and EtherNet/IP (port 44818) and Shodan is not currently designed to
interrogate EtherNet/IP. Shodan successfully scanned the port 80 web management
service for all honeypots in less than 14 days. Table 4.3 provides details on the number of
days from initial deployment to device service interrogation and banner grab.
Table 4.3: Measurement of successful Shodan port 80 interrogation.
Honeypot Days Online
Standard1 8 days 15 hours
Standard2 3 days 10 hours
Advertised 6 days 22 hours
Obfuscated 13 days 10 hours
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4.2.3 Web Interface Identification.
The amount of time between device deployment and the point when the device is
identifiable via the Shodan web interface was also evaluated. Shodan offers two methods
for device identification, web interface and API. When Shodan successfully scans a
device the data is compiled in the Shodan database, but is not immediately available via
the web interface. Therefore, this measurement defines the point at which a device is
identifiable via both Shodan API and web interface, offering device identification to both
sophisticated and basic users. All four honeypots were identifiable via the Shodan web
interface within 19 days. Table 4.4 details the amount of time from initial deployment to
Shodan web interface identification for each honeypot, as well as the delta between first
successful device index and Shodan web interface identification.
Table 4.4: Shodan web interface identification.
Honeypot Days Online Delta
Standard1 18 days 15 hours 10 days
Standard2 18 days 15 hours 15 days
Advertised 6 days 22 hours 1 day
Obfuscated 14 days 10 hours 1 day
4.2.4 Scanning Frequency.
This research measures Shodan’s successful scanning frequency over the 55 day
deployment period. Shodan successfully indexed each honeypot a minimum of four times,
with the Standard1 honeypot receiving the most successful interrogations at eight over the
entire deployment period. Table 4.5 provides details the total successful Shodan service
interrogation as well as the frequency in days.
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Table 4.5: Successful Shodan port interrogation frequency.
Honeypot Total Banner Grabs
Standard1 8
Standard2 6
Advertised 4
Obfuscated 4
4.2.5 Analysis.
No specific scanning trends were identified due likely to the random nature of Shodan
indexing routine. None the less, each honeypot was successfully indexed and identifiable
via the Shodan web interface within 19 days of initial deployment. In addition, each
honeypot was successfully indexed via the Shodan scanning routine within 14 days, with
the Standard1 honeypot indexed in eight days, the Standard2 honeypot indexed in six days,
and both the Advertised and Obfuscated honeypots indexed within four days. Finally,
each honeypot was initially scanned by Shodan in under four days, marking the earliest
time a device could ostensibly be successfully indexed and identifiable via Shodan.
4.3 Network Activity
Network activity is evaluated to determine if activity levels increase post Shodan
identification. An increase in network activity post Shodan identification provides
indications that Shodan impacts Internet-facing ICS security. Network activity is defined
as TCP connections, total TCP packets, and uniques IP addresses interacting with the
honeypot. Shodan identification is defined as the date a honeypot is first identifiable via
the Shodan web interface. This delineation serves to divide network traffic for each
honeypot into two datasets: pre-identification and post-identification. Each dataset (i.e.,
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pre-identification and post-identification) is further subdivided into seven day subsets. The
seven day period accounts for a standardized amount of network traffic for analysis. For
the pre-identification, seven days subsets are determined by counting back from the date of
web interface identification. For the post-identification, seven day subsets are determined
by counting forward from the date of web interface identification. Comparative analysis is
conducted using linear trending, subset mean averages, and one-tailed pairwise t-tests.
4.3.1 Linear Trending.
Linear trending is examined over the full 55 day deployment to characterize the
overall change in network activity, as well as quantify the magnitude of change. Linear
trending is accompanied with an r-squared value indicating the “goodness of fit.” The
r-squared value ranges from 0 to 1, wherein an r-squared value of 1 indicates a perfect fit
to the linear trend. A positive linear trend indicates an overall increase in network activity,
while a negative trend indicates a drop in overall network activity. As shown in Figure 4.7,
the Standard1 honeypot saw positive linear trends across all three metrics; however, the
small r-squared values as shown in Table 4.6 indicate the trend does not fit the data. As
shown in Figure 4.8, for the Standard2 honeypot, the only positive linear trend occurs with
respect to the number of unique IPs; however, the r-squared values across all three metrics
provide an indication the trend lines are not a good fit to the actual data. The Advertised
Table 4.6: Linear trending - “Goodness of Fit” measurement (r-squared values).
Honeypot TCP Connections TCP Packets Unique IPs
Standard1 0.33022 0.58008 0.15437
Standard2 0.00133 0.10187 0.03261
Advertised 0.11171 0.24007 0.00112
Obfuscated 0.00093 0.14169 0.00013
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honeypot saw positive trending in both TCP packets and unique IPs, but a negative trend
for TCP connections (Figure 4.9). The associated r-squared values for all three metrics
indicated a poor fit. The Obfuscated honeypot also saw positive trending in both TCP
packets and unique IPs, but a negative trend for TCP connections with associated
r-squared values indicating poor fit (Figure 4.10). While in some cases linear trending
indicated a positive increase in network activity over the 55 day deployment period, the
associated r-squared values indicate the actual data does not fit the trend. The findings
indicate that there is no linear trend associated with an increase in network activity post
Shodan identification.
Figure 4.7: Linear trending for Standard1 honeypot - 7 day moving mean.
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Figure 4.8: Linear trending for Standard2 honeypot - 7 day moving mean.
4.3.2 Subset Mean Averages.
A comparison of the mean averages is designed to identify statistical differences in
pre-identification network activity as compared to post-identification network activity
levels. The mean averages for each subset are evaluated using a 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.11 details the TCP connection, Figures 4.12 details the total TCP packet, and
Figure 4.13 details the unique IP mean averages for each honeypot. Save for the
Standard2 honeypot subset Post2, the mean averages for post identification are not above
the 95% confidence intervals for pre-identification averages, indicating the network
activity did not change in comparison to pre-identification. The Standard2 subset Post2
dataset for TCP connections, TCP packets, and unique IPs are the only data points that
indicate an increase in mean averages. Evaluation of this dataset revealed a series of
automated scans which accounted for the increased activity.
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Figure 4.9: Linear trending for Advertised honeypot - 7 day moving mean.
Figure 4.10: Linear trending for Obfuscated honeypot - 7 day moving mean.
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Figure 4.11: TCP connections - subset mean averages (95% Confidence Interval).
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Figure 4.12: TCP packets - subset mean averages (95% Confidence Interval).
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Figure 4.13: Unique IPs - subset mean averages (95% Confidence Interval).
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4.3.3 T-test.
A one-tailed pairwise t-test is run across each data subset to validate statistical
differences in the mean average comparative analysis. Note pairwise t-tests require sample
sizes of equal size, therefore pre-identification and post-identification subsets containing
less than seven days are not used for statistical significance testing (e.g., Standard1 subset
Pre1 contains 5 days). Table 4.7 details the Standard1 honeypot, Table 4.8 details the
Standard2 honeypot, Table 4.9 details the Advertised honeypot, and Table 4.10 details the
Obfuscated honeypot. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the null hypothesis,
Shodan does not increase network activity levels post identification, should be rejected
within a 95% confidence interval. These values are indicated in bold within the tables. As
the table indicates, 60% of comparisons the p-value was over 0.05 indicating no statistical
difference in network activity post Shodan identification. In addition, the range of p-values
is so great that no definitive indication can be discerned relating to an increase in activity.
4.3.4 Analysis.
Comparative analysis did not reveal any statistical evidence supporting an increase in
network activity levels post Shodan device identification. While in some cases linear
trending indicated a positive increase in network activity over the 55 day deployment
period, the associated r-squared values indicate the actual data does not fit the trend. A
comparison of subset mean averages revealed post identification mean averages are not
above the 95% confidence intervals for pre-identification averages, indicating no change
in network activity levels. Pairwise t-tests were run across each dataset to validate subset
mean average analysis and in 60% of the comparisons the p-value was over 0.05
indicating no statistical difference in network activity post Shodan identification. In
addition, the range of p-values is so great that no definitive indication can be discerned
relating to an increase in activity.
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Table 4.7: Standard1 honeypot pairwise t-test results.
TCP Connections
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.02695 0.06963 0.07127 0.16176 0.17383
Pre3 0.02142 0.03479 0.02133 0.13273 0.11829
TCP Packets
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.11129 0.03727 0.06228 0.05856 0.08358
Pre3 0.06541 0.02765 0.03070 0.03474 0.07256
Unique IPs
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.28081 0.15482 0.15495 0.46184 0.04326
Pre3 0.02172 0.04135 0.01050 0.06323 0.02225
Table 4.8: Standard2 honeypot pairwise t-test results.
TCP Connections
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.00003 0.00001 0.00102 0.13262 0.03114
Pre3 0.00140 0.00390 0.38386 0.03632 0.00033
TCP Packets
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.00167 0.00024 0.20799 0.04101 0.04169
Pre3 0.01145 0.00707 0.00073 0.00027 0.00008
Unique IPs
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.00003 0.00020 0.01344 0.00560 0.21718
Pre3 0.00006 0.00190 0.41583 0.31875 0.02044
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Table 4.9: Advertised honeypot pairwise t-test results.
TCP Connections
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5 Post6
Pre1 0.09959 0.24874 0.38798 0.05854 0.31123 0.28230
TCP Packets
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5 Post6
Pre1 0.34763 0.36775 0.44635 0.01695 0.21874 0.28703
Unique IPs
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5 Post6
Pre1 0.17683 0.00036 0.41364 0.49536 0.23223 0.02000
Table 4.10: Obfuscated honeypot pairwise t-test results.
TCP Connections
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.13972 0.28200 0.08032 0.46772 0.48205
Pre3 0.21266 0.45995 0.20423 0.33739 0.32586
TCP Packets
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.38344 0.44918 0.03827 0.27077 0.24842
Pre3 0.23379 0.36489 0.11634 0.47665 0.45152
Unique IPs
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.00347 0.38105 0.31894 0.47689 0.07668
Pre3 0.01389 0.50000 0.39741 0.36405 0.09396
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4.3.5 Honeypot Interaction Country of Origin.
Although not specific to research objectives, a broad range of network activity from
multiple countries of origin was observed during the 55 day deployment period. In total,
Chinese-associated IP addresses accounted for a majority of the activity against all
honeypots, accounting for 32%. This is followed closely by the United States with 29%.
Figure 4.14 provides a breakdown of the top ten countries, who, in sum, account for
roughly 75% of all activity targeting the honeypots. Country origins were determined by a
bulk IP lookup using MaxMind batch lookup service [32].
Figure 4.14: Country breakdown for honeypot interaction.
4.4 ICS Specific Targeting
Shodan is capable of being used as a passive reconnaissance tool to identify
Internet-facing ICS devices. This section reports the results of visual packet inspection
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and Snort IDS analysis to identify ICS specific targeting and contrast the rate of targeting
pre-identification versus post-identification.
4.4.1 Visual Packet Inspection.
The Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61 web server provides an implementation
of HTML utilizing Active Server Page (ASP) and Extensible Markup Language (XML)
files. To identify reconnaissance activity via web management interface traversal, a visual
inspection of the network traffic was conducted. Analysis sought to identify specific
HTTP Get requests containing device ASP files coinciding with device traversal and
authentication (Table 4.11). Throughout the 55 day deployment analysis did not reveal
any device reconnaissance as defined by a web management console device traversal.
Reconnaissance is a primary element of network attack and it is assumed ICS specific
targeting would include detailed device inspection. In addition, analysis did not reveal any
attempts, successful or unsuccessful, to access secured areas of the web management
console. Secured areas include Device Configuration, User Management, and Server
Management. Regardless of the device configuration, standard or banner mangled,
analysis did not reveal any evidence of device specific targeting via connection attempts to
the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix management port 44818.
4.4.2 Snort IDS.
To identify and enumerate specific ICS targeting this research utilizes an
implementation of the Security Onion, a Linux distribution designed for intrusion
detection, network security monitoring, and log management. In addition to the latest
Snort implementations, the Digital Bonds Quickdraw SCADA ICS signatures were used
which include DNP3, EtherNet/IP, Modbus TCP, and vulnerability signatures. Analysis
did not reveal any ICS specific targeting as defined by Digital Bond Quickdraw SCADA
IDS signatures. This includes any interaction with known ICS protocols.
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Table 4.11: Visual Packet Inspection - device traversal.
Homepage • home.asp
Device Diagnostics
• diagover.asp
• diagnetwork.asp
• msgconnect.asp
• etherstats.asp
Device Configuration (Secured)
• identity.asp
• network.asp
• services.asp
• emailConfig.asp
User Management (Secured)
• editusers.asp
• editlimits.asp
Server Management (Secured)
• webManage
• webTime
• backupRestore.html
• serverlog.asp
Chassis Identification • chassisWho.asp
Of over 14 thousand alerts, Snort identified only one high alert. The alert was a scan
against the Standard1 honeypot. This scan was categorized as indiscriminate targeting of
Internet-facing devices as it used the ZmEu Scanner designed to identify servers with
vulnerable versions of PHPMyAdmin and the Allen-Bradley web server uses ASP rather
than PHP. Every request for a specific PHP page received a “404 Site or Page not found”
response. Identified alerts appear to be generically targeting Internet-facing devices; no
alerts specifically targeting ICS devices were identified. Table 4.12 identifies the top 5
alerts identified via Snort analysis accounting for over 96% of all alerts identified. Note
these alerts account for non-ICS specific targeting. Each alert indicates the generic alert
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title, generator ID, signature ID, count, and a description of the alert. The alerts included
scans and automated targeting of Windows 95, Windows 98, and Windows ME machines.
All four honeypots received a wide range of scanning activity. These scans registered as
medium or low on the Snort priority scale. Scanning tools identified are readily available
online (e.g., SIPvicious VOIP scanner) and indicate indiscriminate targeting of
web-servers rather than specific device targeting. While these scans do not appear to target
ICS specific devices, it reinforces the notion of device vulnerability purely based on
Internet-facing deployment. In addition, cyber incidents such as the David-Besse Slammer
worm incident have shown the implications of indiscriminate attacks against ICS.
Table 4.12: Description of Snort alerts.
Alert (Generator ID, Sig ID) Count Description
HTTP Inspect (120,8) 3083 Message WITH INVALID CONTENT-LENGTH
OR CHUNK SIZE
HTTP Inspect (120,3) 5764 NO CONTENT-LENGTH OR
TRANSFER-ENCODING IN HTTP RESPONSE
HTTP Inspect (119,31) 391 Unknown Method
Stream5 (129,15) 2982 Reset outside window
Stream5 (129,12) 1982 TCP Small Segment Threshold Exceeded
Although, analysis did not reveal indications of specific ICS targeting, the honeypots
did receive Snort alerts relative to apparent non-ICS specific and indiscriminate targeting
of Internet-facing devices. A comparative analysis was conducted on total snort alerts to
determine if the number of alerts increased post Shodan identification. Figure 4.15 details
the total Snort alerts per day for each honeypot. Note these are not representative of ICS
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specific targeting and merely provide an indication in the level of interaction post Shodan
indexing. All four honeypots indicated a positive linear trend for snort alerts; however, the
r-squared values indicate the actual data does not follow this trend. Figure 4.16 details an
analysis of mean averages for pre-identification subsets to the mean averages for
post-identification subsets using a 95% confidence interval. For each honeypot the post
identification traffic does not have a statistically higher mean than the pre-identification
averages.
A pairwise t-test is conducted across each data subset to determine if
post-identification alert levels are significantly different from pre-identification levels.
Table 4.13 through Table 4.16 show the p-values from these results. A p-value of less than
0.05 indicates that the null hypothesis, Shodan does not increase the number of alerts,
should be rejected within a 95% confidence interval. These values are indicated in bold
within the tables. As the table indicates, in a majority of comparisons (86%) the p-value
was over 0.05 indicating no statistical difference in the number of alerts as a result of
Shodan identification. In addition, the range of p-values is so varied, there is no definitive
indication of an increased number of alerts as a result of Shodan identification.
Table 4.13: Standard1 honeypot Snort IDS alerts - pairwise t-test results.
Snort Alerts
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.06428 0.11963 0.16389 0.05393 0.04837
Pre3 0.02389 0.11054 0.11893 0.01098 0.06069
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Figure 4.15: Comparative analysis - Linear trending over the 55 day deployment.
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Figure 4.16: Comparative analysis - Subset mean averages pre-identification versus post-
identification (95% confidence intervals).
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Table 4.14: Standard2 honeypot Snort IDS alerts - pairwise t-test results.
Snort Alerts
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.06639 0.47150 0.01118 0.13077 0.13592
Pre3 0.33708 0.17284 0.02209 0.44904 0.08429
Table 4.15: Advertised honeypot Snort IDS alerts - pairwise t-test results.
TCP Connections
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5 Post6
Pre1 0.27270 0.44723 0.17792 0.40913 0.15963 0.40736
Table 4.16: Obfuscated honeypot Snort IDS alerts - pairwise t-test results.
Snort Alerts
Post1 Post2 Post3 Post4 Post5
Pre2 0.44820 0.17835 0.45323 0.31060 0.46933
Pre3 0.45464 0.10916 0.33990 0.15361 0.48908
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4.5 Banner Impact
As none of the ICS honeypots received targeted ICS specific attacks, it is not possible
to measure the impact of banner manipulation relative to attack levels. Despite the lack of
targeting, banner manipulation did impact the ability to identify devices via Shodan.
A pilot study was conducted to examine the effects of banner manipulation on
Shodan web interface device identification with the goal of assessing the ability to limit
device exposure from ICS specific targeting. During the study, an ICS researcher was
tasked to use Shodan to identify Allen-Bradley PLCs. Note the researcher was unaware of
the service banner modifications made to the mangled honeypots. Each listing of potential
devices was examined to determine if the Advertised and Obfuscated devices were
exposed based on the search query.
Table 4.17 details the initial round of Shodan search queries using basic knowledge
of an Allen-Bradley PLC, to include manufacturer, model, device type, and service ports.
Table 4.18 details a second round of search queries with the researcher using specific
information regarding the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC port 80 web management
service banner. Each table outlines the individual search queries, the total number of
devices identified, and an indication of which device was among the query results. Note
that the results for Standard1 and Standard2 were the same for each query. For nearly
every search query, the Advertised honeypot was among the Shodan results and in
multiple cases the Advertised honeypot was the sole device. Alternatively, the Obfuscated
honeypot was only identified in two cases, search results containing devices offering port
80 and index.html. With a port 80 query returning 170,467,439 results and index.html
returning 1,021,319 results, it is unlikely the Obfuscated honeypot would be directly
targeted as an ICS device. The results of a comparison of all four honeypots indicate the
Advertised honeypot is likely to be more readily identified for ICS specific targeting based
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on the ease of identification using simple search queries, while the Obfuscated honeypot is
nearly unidentifiable save for two queries with results extending into the millions.
Table 4.17: Shodan results - basic knowledge of the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC.
Query Devices Identified Standard1/Standard2 Advertised Obfuscated
Allen 3350 X
Bradley 2638 X
Allen-Bradley 98 X
ControlLogix 1 X
PLC 11958 X
Port:80 170467439 X X X
Port:44818 0
Allen ControlLogix 1 X
Allen PLC 8
Allen port:80 83 X
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1 X
Allen-Bradley PLC 7
Allen-Bradley port:80 1 X
Allen-Bradley PLC port:80 0
Bradley ControlLogix 1 X
PLC ControlLogix 0
4.6 Discussion
This research provides an extension of previous work in the ICS honeypot arena.
Wilhoit’s research found a significant level of device targeting, noting attacks within 18
hours of deployment and 39 targeted attacks over the 28 day deployment [52]. In addition,
Wilhoit’s subsequent ICS honeynet deployment resulted in 74 attacks, 11 defined as
critical, over a 90 day deployment. Wilhoit defined critical as an attack with unestablished
motivation but capable of catastrophic failure of an ICS device’s operations [52]. The
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Table 4.18: Shodan results - knowledge of the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC service
banner.
Query Devices Identified Standard1/Standard2 Advertised Obfuscated
GoAhead-Webs 23428 X X
Connection: Close 102449800 X X
index.html 1021319 X X X
GoAhead-Webs Connection: Close 51104 X X
GoAhead-Webs index.html 16184 X X
Connection: Close index.html 338683 X X
GoAhead-Webs Connection: Close index.html 490 X X
remaining 63 attacks were classified as non-critical, as defined as the inability to cause
catastrophic failure (e.g., denial of service attack) [52]. Wilhoit also noted 33,466
automated attacks originating from 1,212 unique IP addresses. Wilhoit’s results appear
inconsistent with the findings of this research, wherein no targeted ICS attacks were
identified. The primary differences between the two research efforts include: specific
research goals and individual honeypot implementation.
Wilhoit’s primary objective was to assess who is attacking Internet-facing ICS
devices and provide indications as to attack motivations. As such, Wilhoit intentionally
took steps to solicit the honeypots, seeding the devices on Google, Pastebin, and Shodan,
while also utilizing naming conventions to readily identify the devices (e.g., SCADA-1).
Alternatively, the primary goal of this research was to evaluate the impact of Shodan on
Internet-facing ICS devices, utilizing a generic characterization of ICS devices currently
identifiable via Shodan for honeypot design and configuration. As such, devices were
deployed unsolicited and utilizing naming conventions akin to Allen-Bradley
ControlLogix PLCs currently identifiable via Shodan (i.e., a descriptive device name
incorporating device deployment location). Each honeypot device was configured with a
device name designed to infer the device was newly deployed and associated with a water
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utility (e.g., ab.2013.water.s3). The vast contrast in research findings may be a result of
device solicitation, indicating malicious actors are utilizing other avenues of ICS device
reconnaissance beyond Shodan.
Wilhoit utilized both high-interaction and low-interaction honeypots. Wilhoit’s
high-interaction honeypots were comprised of a simulated PLC implemented via Honeyd
and a HMI implemented via a Dell DL360 server, each acting as a basic PHP web server.
Wilhoit’s results identified multiple attacks in the form of targeted PHP attacks against
individual honeypots. Alternatively, the honeypots deployed in support of this research
utilized physical Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLCs whose web server uses an
implementation of XML and ASP. Despite the lack of PHP, analysis identified a number
of apparent automated attacks targeting PHP web servers. It is possible the PHP targeted
attacks identified by Wilhoit were due to the particular implementation of an
Internet-facing PHP web server, rather than specific ICS targeted attacks. In addition, it is
possible the existence of potentially vulnerable PHP web servers increased device
identification and subsequent targeting.
In addition to specific web server implementation, Wilhoit’s simulated PLC and HMI
honeypots lacked functional and operating characteristics associated with actual PLC
devices. Indeed, the PLC honeypot used an implementation of Honeyd, utilizing python to
present a generic web page simulating a water pressure station. Malicious device
modifications and user reads/writes could be accomplished by changing values in a web
form. The HMI honeypot offered attackers direct interaction with a simulated HMI
wherein any simple modification (e.g., clicking to open a valve) was deemed a targeted
attack against the associated PLC. Alternatively, the physical PLCs utilized in support of
this research required actual authentication, albeit default username and password, to
perform any modification via the web management console. In addition, to alter PLC
operations required direct interaction with the device EtherNet/IP management service, as
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well as additional software to upload, download, and alter ladder logic. Note that past
research has indicated that use of actual devices for honeypots, as in this research,
provides a better indicator of attack tactics than simulated devices, as in Wilhoit’s research
[44].
4.7 Summary
This chapter provides results of network analysis performed for this research. An
examination of Shodan’s indexing routine revealed all four newly deployed and
unsolicited devices were successfully indexed and identified within 19 days. Analysis of
network activity post Shodan identification provided no indication of increased device
interaction, as defined by TCP connections, total TCP packet count, and unique IP
addresses. Neither visual packet inspection nor Snort IDS analysis revealed any instances
of ICS specific device targeting or attacks, as defined by web management traversal,
attempted access to secured areas of the web management interface, port 44818
interrogation and interaction. Given no ICS specific attacks, a comparison of the ability to
limit device targeting via banner manipulation was not possible. However, pilot study
results indicate service banner manipulation decreases device susceptibility to
identification vis Shodan search engine queries. Findings indicate Shodan is a capable ICS
reconnaissance tool, with the ability to index and identify unsolicited Internet-facing ICS
devices. The results of this research, however, indicate Shodan does not currently impact
Internet-facing ICS device security, but it is expected Shodan will become a more
prevalent passive reconnaissance tool based on its capability to readily identify ICS
devices.
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V. Conclusions
Cyber attacks akin to Stuxnet and the Slammer worm illustrate the potential
exploitation of ICS via both targeted and inadvertent attacks, each capable of significant
damage. Throughout the ICS security community the vulnerability and fragility of ICS is
widely understood and the once mythical ICS air gap was shattered by the work of
Leverett and Project SHINE. Shodan is a capable passive reconnaissance tool, whose
scanning routine ensures most Internet-facing devices will be indexed given enough time.
Additionally, a basic knowledge of devices and services allows users to craft
device-specific signatures and create targeted lists of Internet accessible devices.
Findings indicate network activity did not increase post indexing in Shodan, and
most targeting appeared indiscriminate. Previous work by Wilhoit with ICS honeypots
indicated a number of targeted attacks; however, this research did not collaborate these
findings as no ICS-specific targeted attacks were observed. This is likely based on the
difference in honeypot design, implementation, and solicitation.
5.1 Conclusions
The exponential growth of the Internet, increased network connectivity, and the need
for remote access has led to a significant number of ICS devices directly connected to the
Internet. Previous research efforts revealed an exorbitant number of ICS devices are
currently deployed Internet-facing [6, 30] and Shodan is able to readily identify these
devices. Security professionals and news outlets at large publicize the perils of Shodan
and by all indications Shodan should be categorized as a threat to Internet-facing ICS,
however, there lacks empirical evidence linking Internet-facing device targeting to Shodan
device identification.
98
The overall goal of this research is to evaluate Shodan’s impact on Internet-facing
ICS device security by deploying a series of high-interaction ICS honeypots. The primary
goals are to evaluate Shodan indexing functionality, contrast network activity levels as a
result of Shodan identification, and enumerate any ICS specific targeting and attacks. An
examination of Shodan’s indexing routine revealed all four newly deployed and
unsolicited devices were successfully indexed and identified within 19 days. Analysis of
network activity post Shodan identification provided no indication of increased network
activity. Neither visual packet inspection nor Snort IDS analysis revealed any instances of
ICS specific device targeting or attacks.
The secondary goal of this research is to assess the impact of ICS device service
banner data relative to device identification within Shodan and subsequently evaluate the
ability to limit Shodan device exposure via banner manipulation. The lack of specific ICS
targeting prohibited an evaluation of the ability to limit device targeting via banner
manipulation was not possible. However, pilot study results indicate service banner
manipulation decreases device susceptibility to identification vis Shodan search engine
queries.
The overall findings indicate Shodan does not currently impact Internet-facing ICS
device security, but research has demonstrated Shodan’s utility as a passive
reconnaissance tool. With the continued growth and connectivity of ICS devices, it is
expected Shodan will become more commonly used tool to target ICSs.
5.2 Future Work
This research presented an evaluation of Shodan’s impact on Internet-facing ICS
device security. This section presents ideas for future work regarding the ICS honeypots.
5.2.1 Deployment Location.
The ability to obtain Internet-facing IP space co-located with an ICS entity limited
the honeynet design and the size of the honeynet. Available resources allowed for the
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deployment of four ICS honeypots and dictated the honeypots be deployed with sequential
static IP addresses in the same subnet. Future research should seek a broader deployment
across multiple venues to include: commercial IP space, residential IP space, and
co-located with government networks (e.g., outside Wright-Patterson .mil network). In
addition, future work should look to deploy honeypots in multiple critical infrastructure
sectors to include oil and gas, water distribution systems, and electrical utilities.
5.2.2 Deployment Length.
The deployment period for this research was 55 days based on previous ICS
honeypot research and an approximation of the time required to scan all public IPv4
addresses. Future research should extend honeypot deployment to six months or as long as
a year to allow for a larger dataset for comparative analysis and trending.
5.2.3 Honeypot Type.
Future research should consider the utilization of low-interaction honeypots
alongside high-interaction honeypots. Low-interaction honeypots would open the Amazon
EC2 cloud deployment venue, offering the ability to deploy multiple ICS honeypots
creating a larger dataset for analysis. In addition, Honeyd offers the ability to proxy
requests to any predefined IP address. As such, future work could use an Amazon Cloud
deployment with Honeyd proxying port 80 and port 44818 requests to a physical PLC,
creating a hybrid ICS honeypot offering the advantages of both high and low-interaction
honeypots.
5.2.4 Honeypot Design.
The honeypots deployed in support of this research were designed and configured to
be representative of ICS devices currently identifiable via Shodan. Configuration also
utilized default username and password to simulate a newly deployed PLC. To
supplement the notion of a newly deployed PLC, devices were deployed with the default
system time. For ControlLogix system time defaults to 1 January 1970. As presented in
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this research, Shodan queries are able to use this system time to identify devices which
have been online for a specific time period. Future research should consider changing the
system time on devices to represent a device which has been online for multiple years,
potentially providing a more enticing target for exploitation.
5.2.5 Programmable Logic Controller.
This research uses the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61 CPU module and
eWeb Ethernet module. Future work should incorporate both additional manufacturers
and models. At a minimum, device manufacturers should be extended to include Siemens
and Schneider as they represent the number two and three primary PLC suppliers in North
America [2].
5.2.6 Shodan Device Categorization.
Shodan is a capable passive reconnaissance tool able to readily identify
Internet-facing ICS devices. Utilizing only three key terms relating to the Allen-Bradley
ControlLogix PLC, over 490 devices were identified. Future research should investigate
and classify ICS devices currently identifiable via Shodan relative to United States critical
infrastructure sectors.
5.3 Concluding Remarks
The protection of United States critical infrastructure is vital to national security and
ICSs are the backbone of many critical infrastructure sectors. Trends indicate ICS growth
is expected to flourish and the innate demand for availability has resulted in an increased
level of Internet connectivity. Homeland security officials have warned that the obscurity
that previously protected many industrial control systems is quickly disappearing in a
flood of digital light [39]. In 2009, the Shodan computer search engine was launched
creating a database of Internet-facing devices, identifying hundreds of millions of devices
over the past four years, most notably an untold number of ICS devices. Shodan is capable
of functioning as a passive reconnaissance tool capable of specifically identifying ICS
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devices exposed to the Internet. Independent research definitively proved Shodans
capabilities, identifying thousands of ICS associated devices, many with weak or default
authentication. Subsequent research provided evidence of malicious actors directly
attacking a simulated United States water control system. This research sought to
correlate Shodan device identification with direct ICS targeting and measure Shodans
impact on Internet-facing ICS device security. Findings indicate although Shodans
scanning routine virtually guarantees the eventual indexing and identification of
Internet-facing ICS devices, a measurement of network activity post identification does
not indicate Shodan is actively being used as a reconnaissance tool for ICS attack. Despite
these findings, Shodan is a more than capable of identifying exposed ICS devices and as
such poses a real threat to Internet-facing ICS and thereby national security. It is expected
as ICS vulnerabilities and exploits become more readily known, Shodans will become a
primary tool for malicious actors to directly target ICSs.
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